1/8 Under the principle that "houses are for living in, not for speculation," according to a meeting held jointly by the PBoC the CBIRC, "housing should never be used as a short-term stimulus for economic growth".
2/8 This seems to me to be a very clear statement that while in the past property investment has contributed a great deal to economic activity, and thus to China's reported GDP, the regulators do not believe that it has contributed an equivalent amount...
3/8 to China's real economy – or else why distinguish between its short-term stimulative impact and its longer-term impact? This simply reinforces Xi Jinping's recent distinction between "fictional" growth and "genuine" growth.
4/8 But if we accept that part (a substantial part, in my opinion) of Chinese economic activity in the past several years contributed to China's GDP but not to real underlying growth in the economy, what does that tell us about future growth?
5/8 Most analysts are now willing accept (very belatedly in many cases) that there has been a meaningful amount of "fictional" growth embedded in China's recent GDP growth numbers, but they implicitly assume that this creates no cost or burden for future growth.
6/8 I think this is clearly wrong, and reflects the fact that economists don't know how to model "fictional" growth – or its reversal. The fictitious wealth created through "fictional" growth must be amortized over time, and just as this added to GDP growth...
7/8 as it was being created, it must subtract from GDP growth as it is amortized.
One potential problem with all this is the way the benefits and costs of fictitious wealth are allocated. Historically the benefits of fictitious wealth tend to accrue disproportionately...
8/8 to politically powerful groups, while the cost tends to be borne disproportionately by ordinary households. Beijing should try to ensure that the costs are allocated to the same groups that received the benefits.
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1/6 “China currently doesn’t need to conduct asset purchases,” Yi Gang, governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), wrote in the September issue of Financial Research on Tuesday. scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/6 “Conditions allow this because the country’s potential economic growth potential is expected to stay between 5 and 6 per cent, and the yield curve can be maintained at a normal upward slope.”
3/6 This is an interesting point. I would argue (and so would an increasing number of Chinese and foreign analysts, it seems) that China can only maintain 5-6% growth rates as long as monetary policy accommodates explosive growth in debt.
1/10
Regulators seem to be increasing inspection of the activities of onshore FX traders, according to this article, forcing them to cut back on derivative products, to tighten bid-offer spreads and to reduce trading volume.
2/10
As I have long argued, all the over-excited talk about the RMB becoming a major global currency is regularly undermined by regulatory actions aimed at protecting the Chinese economy from the costs and risks associated with major global currencies, and this is...
3/10
perhaps just one more example. Beijing seems especially worried about the vulnerabilities created by the recent opening-up of its financial markets to foreign investors, and is worried that changes in US monetary policies could be disruptive domestically.
1/11
Very good ChinaTalk interview of my friend Logan Wright, with lots of useful insights. There is one point he makes that I think is very important, even if not enough people covering China appreciate it. He says: "I think there's generally more...
2/11
coherence right now in Beijing about the critique of China's current growth model rather than coherence around what that alternative would really look like."
Logan is right. Beijing knows what it doesn't want, but it hasn't yet accepted the only sustainable alternative.
3/11
Policymakers have discussed the urgent need to rebalance the economy at least since 2006-07, after which we've had various attempts to resolve China’s economic imbalances by controlling the rise in debt, by structural supply-side reform, by insisting that “homes...
Zhou Xin writes: "News that China’s disciplinary watchdog will send inspectors into the country’s financial regulators and its top state-owned financial institutions to look for signs of corruption, negligence and disloyalty could soon...
2/4 be keeping some Chinese bankers awake at nights."
In a tweet I posted a few days ago I said that the Beijing rumor mill was buzzing ferociously with talk about senior financial officials, especially from an institution I cannot yet name, that were likely to get caught up...
3/4 in investigations in the next few weeks and months because of their involvement in questionable financial deals that characterized (as they always do) the boom period of rapid growth, soaring debt, and asset price bubbles.
1/4 Good piece by Niall Ferguson (@nfergus) who also thinks that the history of the USSR in the 1960s and early 1970s has a lot to teach us about a sustainable growth trajectory in China.
2/4 I've long argued that japan in the 1980s and the USSR in the 1960s are important historical precedents in helping us understand how this growth model works. Every country that has achieved "miracle" growth...
3/4 under the high-savings/high-investment model — of which the USSR and Japan are just the most famous — has later shifted into a phase in which growth is driven mainly by surging debt and the systemic creation of bezzle. carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…
1/13
While I agree with most of what Ruchir Sharma says in this piece, I am more skeptical than he is about the following: "The problem: what happens in China no longer stays in China, which is the main engine of global growth."
2/13
While China is the largest arithmetical component of global growth, this doesn't make it the main engine of global growth in any meaningful sense. In a world of excess desired savings, the engine of growth is demand, and not only is China not the biggest source of net...
3/13
demand to the global economy, it is in fact the biggest net absorber of global demand, with monthly trade surpluses of around $50 billion. That is why a crisis in China won't affect the real economies of the rest of the world in the same way as a crisis in the US might.