Thread by @umaraqti

Since talks with TTP are being debated, hence in this thread I will focus on TTP based on these factors.

For any insurgency to sustain and be successful, it depends on the following factors:
1. Ideology
2. Local support/manpower
3. Financial and military support (Foreign)

Many mistakenly think that TTP demand of imposition of Shariah got them support across Pak hence they managed to wreak havoc.
Note: This point is not for or against the imposition of Shariah but to clarify TTP's phenomenal rise to a brutal insurgency..

..wasn't directly linked to Shariah's demand. There were, still are many groups (violent and non-violent) in Pak that demand the imposition of Shariah but no one got even close to TTP.

TTP derives its ideology & rallying cry from anti-US sentiments..

..the war in Afghanistan & Pak becoming a (reluctant) ally of the US's war in Afghanistan. TTP ideology and support from the local population got a hit after the APS attack and the withdrawal of the US & allies from Afghanistan.

An objective look at the current TTP insurgency will tell you that they are reduced to Waziristan and limited to IED attacks. They don't pose a serious threat compared to what they were at their peak, nevertheless, they are still a challenge to a state in Waziristan.

After the withdrawal of the US and allies from Afghanistan, TTP lost 1) and 3) but still has 2) which is limited to Waziristan.

Some may argue and question that if they are ineffective and limited to a small area in Pakistan then why state need to talk to these terrorists?

Esp when our past negotiations were never honored and failed. Aren't we appeasing religious fanatics again?

Let me share few instances of 2019 to explain that in my view we are not and why an 'ONLY' military solution will not help resolve this predicament.

In 2019, when security forces took action against terrorists of TTP and its affiliated groups that were targeting Security forces, Govt & private company officials, and pro-state tribal elders -- all these ops and actions were immediately politicized..

..and used against the state and Army. Some of them are:
• Khaisur incident which was picked by PTM and used against the state.
(tribune.com.pk/story/1902970/…)

•KharQamar Incident:
Again picked by PTM in which Mohsin and Ali Wazir ..were directly involved..

..in inciting the locals to violence and led them to attack an army check post.

•Hayatabad incident:
In which TTP terrorists were killed after a 17-hour long battle yet PTM and Manzoor Pashteen went to the killed terrorists' home and tried to prove them innocent.

These are a few cases I am highlighting to explain that how some valid IBOs and military ops based on correct intelligence can be turned against the state & army under the guise of activism and rights.

That doesn't mean that in these IBOs and military ops no innocent came in a crossfire or there isn't any collateral damage. This collateral damage is then used as cannon fodder by the enemy, secessionists, agenda-driven & foreign-found activists and movements..

..hence point 2 remains relevant and irritant for any "political" govt and state.

Next, the logical questions that arise:

How to go about and deal with them in Waziristan? Talks or Military Ops?

In my view, both can go side by side, the state never relies on one option or plan. Military solutions can give space, which we already got..

..now we need a political solution & socio-economic development of these war-ravaged areas to deny any space to those who can exploit their grievances and may end up again in a perpetual conflict cycle.

Closing remarks: There are many claiming that we are 'again' appeasing religious fanatics & terrorists thus repeating the mistake.

In my view, we are not, the state does give a chance to "ALL" from a position of power (right or wrong is another debate). For e.g:

1/ Giving amnesties to Baloch terrorist groups.

2/ Those who actively participated in secessionist and militant movements against the state were allowed to re-integrate e.g Najam Sethi, Afrasiyab Khattak, Muhammad Ali Talpur, Ahmed Rashid. [All of these have now taken the role..

..the role of fifth columnists and encourage secessionists movements]. NAP (current ANP), MQM (sans Altaf), Murtaza Bhutto

3/ Dr. Khan sb opposed NWFP joining Pak, yet the state made him the first CM of West Pak when one unit was promulgated. His brother's party..

..and ideology went on to become a secessionist and militant group. The same goes for Mengals.

None of the aforementioned examples are from religious groups. It's one thing and natural to be skeptical about the ongoing negotiation process with some TTP group but..

..it's another thing to keep advocating for perpetual military solutions because you hate and don't like the far-right wing ideologies.