Worth remembering just what a boondoggle give-away to North Korea the Kaesong Industrial Zone was. 'Detente' it was not:
"Throughout its life cycle until its closure in 2016, the Kaesong complex faced nagging questions - not only about slave labor & unsafe working conditions,
but also about the use of its proceeds to fund Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program...Kaesong provided Pyongyang nearly $100 million a year in hard currency. No one but Kim Jong-un really knew where the money went. The N Korean workers at Kaesong were selected by the regime, had
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no rights to strike or bargain for better working conditions, were not permitted to speak to their S Korean managers, and received as little as $2 a month out of $130 a month in “wages” paid to the N Korean government by the S Korean manufacturers who invested there. None of
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the managers could say how much the North Korean workers were paid, if at all."
Gross. And apparently re-opening this gimmicky subsidy to NK will promote 'peace.' Um, it won't...
They won't seriously risk their rule or material perks for a psychological (nationalist) pay-off. In fact, IMO, both Koreas are de facto status quo states, despite de jure revisionism:
1. Talk is Cheap
So sure, both Koreas talk tough and maintain formal commitments to
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unification, but talk is cheap obviously and leaders lie a lot. Unification might be formally retained as an end-goal, but only as a far-off, de rigeur ideal recited ceremonially, rather than actually seriously planned for or built into NK strategy. I could be convinced of the
quagmire with no obvious endpoint. That is not K at all. The war has been over since mid-1953, and it is NK, not the allies, who provokes. The lack of paperwork - a formal peace treaty - has no bearing on the empirical situation on the ground which is far from open conflict.
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B. A 'War-Ending Declaration' (종전선언) is a legally bizarre neologism which no one really understands
The only reason this strange language is used is bc the Moon government's first effort to get a 'peace treaty' failed, as did its second, vaguer 'peace regime' effort. So
THREAD: Strategically, 9/11 was a one-off sucker-punch. That’s it.
1. 9/11 did not ‘change everything.’ In fact, it changed surprisingly little
This language was deployed to create political space for a vast expansion of US coercion, especially in the Middle East. If all the
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rules have suddenly changed, then all sorts of behavior are suddenly permissible – like domestic spying, torture, and Iraq. But strategically, 9/11 did not change that much: US GDP continued to expand; US military power was scarcely affected; US alliances did not fracture; the
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stock market re-opened after a few days and did not crash; gas prices did not spike; the global Islamic revolution Osama Bin Laden hoped this would ignite did not materialize:
If the Afghan withdrawal & 20th anniversary of 9/11 can wind-down our big foot-print 'war on terror' (for a more measured counter-terrorism), here is a quick case for greater restraint:
of empires/hegemonies is too many commitments and too few resources. We should, obviously, avoid such overstretch, & given rising China, US commitments in the Middle East particularly (Afghanistan, e.g.) should be re-considered
2. Domestic/Democratic: Blowback Militarization
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The post-9/11 militarization of US foreign policy has come home: in the torture debate (yes, we actually 'debated' torture), domestic surveillance, endemic governmental secrecy, near reverence on military and police issues (just watch Fox for 5 minutes),and the militarization/