Hearing that some alarm bells are starting to ring @BritishArmy that the ability to generate and declare a high readiness (Armd/Mech) brigade to NATO in 2024 is looking less likely.

Now, should it be "difficult" for a 75,000-person Army to train and equip "a mere" 5-6,000 unit?
Well, as regards personnel, there should be no problem whatsoever. But as regards equipment, there lies the rub... Look at it this way:
1. The UK can barely, and not sustainably, generate a single regiment of Challenger 2.
2. It is the same for AS90.
3. Warrior CSP is gone, and even had it been signed for production last year, there wouldn't be two, TRAINED BGs by H1 2024.
4. Ajax, if fixable (looking not that good), won't see unit (ie regt) service before 2025, if then.
5. Boxer won't see enough vehs delivered to be deployable (under current delivery plans) by H1 2024.
6. Challenger 3 won't see regt service (UK will, basically, have one regt) before c.2028, at best.
7. ISD for any new 155mm is firmly post-2025, if then.
So, what would such a bgde deploy? A half-regt of CR2, CVR(T), FV430s, maybe Bulldog, and Warrior, topped up with Jackal etc. Arty from a handful of 155mm, some MLRS, and maybe a Lt Gun btty? Is this ORBAT an act of war, or a collection of enactment enthusiasts?
What would the survivability of such a unit be in the current most likely scenario, operations in/around the Baltic States/Poland? Is it/would it be politically capable of deployment?
"Don't worry! We'll declare 3 Cdo Bgde @RoyalMarines as our high readiness bdge!" Is there actually a BRIGADE still there? If two Commandos are now tasked to Littoral Strike, then the options for them operating as part of a coherent bgde would seem to have wandered off.
OK, all/part of @16AirAssltBCT with an AH combat team from @ArmyAirCorps @1st_Aviation wouldn't be a "shabby" offering to NATO. But when was the last time that 16AA trained as a brigade? And the utility of what would be quite a static formation in Baltic States/Poland ops?
The core issue here is that the Army's failure over AFV procurement would seem to be coming home to roost. Ignoring the hvy force in the 2000s-mid-2010s can now be seen (it was seen at the time, but no-one wanted to talk about it) to have been a complete disaster.
Lord alone knows that other countries/armies have their own procurement problems! But the British Army has managed to go close to 25yrs without buying any new AFVs, or even upgrading them seriously. When Belgium, Denmark, Poland have all done better, think about it.
As I have said before, the situation is so parlous, that the British Army might soon have to send a sick note from Matron to NATO: "excused games".

This ought to be an embarrassment, a national one. Is the situation solvable? Only in a Potemkin way.
You could create the appearance of a capable bdge, and hope that no-one notices that 25% of the vehicles are over 40-50yrs old, and un-upgraded (PS no-one in Europe, let alone the USA is under any illusions of the Army's problems).
And all of this is before one considers the sustainability of the current force, which will have to solider on longer than anticipated. 30mm RARDEN ammo? Two war natures saw the end of their safety certification earlier this year.
Sure, you can re-certificate, but the chances of getting all the rounds done is low. AS90 155mm ammo? Same deal, and there are issues with CR2 ammo. It has been reported that the US Army on a recent CP Ex was astonished when their Brit counterparts "ran out" of ammo.
@BAESystemsplc, and others, are being given £000m contracts to re-source spares for Warrior, FV430/CVR(T) and the like, as unless this happens, the UK will end up, quite quickly, with next to no AFVs at all.
Hoping that "things" will crop up to make "things" better is hardly a serious position. The Army is close to being combat incapable against high-end threats, the ones that are largely seen as a key aspect of the future.
But whispers from Andover say that @ArmyCGS is still spending vast amounts of time on the "Army Special Forces", to the detriment of the wider Army capability. What relevance these units if the remainder of the Army is simply incapable?
If I were to make a (bad?) comparison, it is as follows: the British Army of today resembles its forebears in June 1940, just after the completion of Operation Dynamo. You've got personnel - but next to no equipment.
And what is being dug out of depots is old, not combat capable, and being used out of desperation, not desire.

There has to be a realisation that the Army is not, as CGS says, "feral warriors", up for anything, but a shadow of what it was, and what is needed.

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More from @FTusa284

17 Aug
@larisamlbrown @SheridanDani @helenwarrell @jeromestarkey @bealejonathan @BFBSRadioHQ @DefenceOps @DefenceHQPress @UKStratCom @ArmyCGS @VAdmBenKey
Seeing footage of Taliban press conference(s?) in Kabul, they've now held more, and more open (ie not restricting access) in 3 days
Than UK MoD has held in more than 3 years.

So, basically, the Taliban has a greater understanding, greater grasp and knowledge of so-called "Information Operations" than pretty much the entire UK MoD.

For those who think info ops are a real something, ponder this...
A theocratic insurgency has a greater understanding about giving as wide access to its message as it can, than a supposedly (wannabe) digital-savi western military.

Will anyone at the MoD learn? Simple answer? Not a bat in hell's chance.
Read 4 tweets
4 Jun
Vibration, and what it is doing to the programme.

"The Terms of Reference asked us to consider two questions, readiness of IOC and likely readiness for deployment of the Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR) in 2023."
"In terms of IOC, the Capability Drop 1 vehicles are in the hands of the Army in trials and with HCR. There remains significant concern both in relation to noise and vibration in the vehicles and the variation in levels of vibration across the fleet."
Read 21 tweets
3 Jun
I'll go back to something that only really just "jumped out" of the IPA Ajax report:

"Given there is no alternative supplier or platform option..."

@cabinetofficeuk IPA report: did they come up with this assessment on their own? Or was it what they were told by the Army? Well..
Read these to the "Vision On Gallery Tune" (Showing my sadly inevitable age)...
Read 12 tweets
3 Jun
Another @BritishArmy AFV thought. I'm told that the process of buying a replacement for AS90 has kicked off. Now, the "favourite" at this stage seems to be the Hanwha K-9 - tracked.
But here's one thought: if Ajax does get canned, then the overwhelming number of AFVs that the Army will have will be wheeled. So, what are the issues of coherence of trying to mix-and-match wheels and tracks.
OK, it'll have to be rationalised for CR3/Boxer, c'est la vie. But what are the implications for Boxer Brigade Combat Teams if the main AFVs can move at 50mph down the motorways, but their artillery has to follow at 15mph on low loaders?
Read 6 tweets
3 Jun
Thanks to individual who posed me the question as to Ajax's risk rating as per the annual Infrastructure and Project Authority's report on MoD programmes. Well, in last year's report, it was rated "AMBER"...
But in the 2021 Ajax report, "The Delivery Confidence Assessment is rated RED.." In other words, the programme's status has deteriorated - it's got worse, not better.
AMBER definition is: "Successful delivery appears feasible but significant issues already exist, requiring management attention. These appear resolvable at this stage and, if addressed promptly, should not present a cost/schedule overrun."
Read 6 tweets
2 Jun
@jeromestarkey @larisamlbrown @SheridanDani @bealejonathan @helenwarrell @thinkdefence
@UKDefJournal @JonHawkes275 @TotherChris @harry_lye @nicholadrummond
More to come re the Infrastructure and Projects Authority report on Ajax tomorrow, but a few thoughts from first data drop..
Basically, the IPA report shows utter incontinence as regards programme management across the piece. There isn't a, "oh, it failed here" - no: it has been systematic programme failure across the board. I will quote tomorrow from the IPA report to back this up...
One key conclusion is about "hand offs" - they are badly managed. Now, in ANY programme there are times when one manger hands something over to another - that's what happens. But the IPA Ajax report seems to suggest that for a number/a lot of "hands offs", that Ajax managers...
Read 16 tweets

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