Twitter is buzzing about Jiang's interview with @CNN. I've never interviewed Jiang, but here is what I can corroborate by the Chinese sources. 1: police were sometimes armed, and detainees were commonly hooded during transport
Some officers reported that they assisted in the detentions of hundreds of people each day
Many of these officers came from neidi (inner/eastern China) as part of the Aid Xinjiang 援疆 program. Their posts typically lasted three months
Police regularly inspected Uyghur homes.
This thread may not be satisfying to some (many), but the testimony suggests an intimate understanding of the situation (i.e., detention process), which most people don't possess.
@GFPhilosophy I’m not sure who you are. But my wife’s sister is here so I’m kinda doing my own thing. I’ll give you the benefit of the doubt. What would you like me to explain? Why 土炕改造 is different in Uyghur communities from neidi?
@GFPhilosophy it's late, i want to go to sleep, so I'm going to assume that is the question. First, we cannot equate سۇپا with 土炕, although Chinese conflates the two. Supa is often the site for religio-social rites such as name-giving ceremonies and circumcisions. not the case in 内地
@GFPhilosophy although 土炕改造 is used in the 新疆民生 source I posted, it isn't it's own policy in the region. Rather it's part of the 三新活动. In Uyghur communities, authorities require families to tear down 拆除 or tear apart 拆 the supa. I.E., it cannot remain
Let’s continue. To be honest, I’m not sure if this is a take on banknotes/nods to indigenous groups or language policy, but I’m going to treat it as an uninformed attempt to create a mirage hiding current language policy. Fact: Uyghur will, at best, become a “kitchen language”
The Party’s goal has been clear: all schools in Xinjiang are expected to adopt “mode 3” delivery—i.e., Chinese as the language of instruction (and using native languages only if necessary). (from Zuliyati Simayi, yes, this Zuliyatyi)
Some locales failed to meet the 2016 deadline, but are still expected to institute these changes, so they’ve dramatically increased the number of classroom hours spent on Chinese.
Chinese media, CCP leaders, and apologists have been recycling the official number of mosques to convince you that Uyghurs and Kazakhs can freely express piety. This number is meaningless. Here are the facts (from Chinese sources):
Minors, college students, and anyone who is employed by the government cannot attend mosque. Period. It is stated explicitly outside many mosques (my photo from Pichan which says no minors can enter).
Schools devote classroom time to instruct students not to believe in religion and not to enter mosques.
March’s second scholar spotlight features Andrew Grant @angrant_1 and what will surely be his seminal work on urbanization, infrastructure, and #ethnicity in western China/eastern #Tibet, esp. Xining. Currently, Andrew is a VAP at @BostonCollege's International Studies Program.
Grant’s research provides sparkling examples of the cutting-edge work on Sino-Tibetan studies produced by geographers. Thorough, balanced, and with nuanced application of theory, his publications appear in @Pol_Geog_Jl, @CriticAsianStds, and Eurasian Journal of Geo and Econ.
His forthcoming book, “Borders of Global China,” will be published next year by @CambridgeUP. This book will be part of the Global China Elements Series edited by CK Lee.