What to make of the blizzard of French presidential polls in recent days? The racist far-right pundit Eric Zemmour (no apologies for the word racist) is at 15% in first round in one poll, just behind Marine Le Pen but miles behind President Macron 1/
In another poll, @EmmanuelMacron is seen soundly defeating all challengers in the two candidate second round on 24 April. He beats Zemmour 65-35, Le Pen 60-40 and the leading (for now) centre-right contender, Xavier Bertrand, 55-45 3/
Internal, unpublished polls are also said to show that a centre-right “closed primary” on 4 December will be a close-run thing & that, against all expectations, @MichelBarnier could emerge narrowly as the choice of 80K members of Les Républicains 4/
As a result, Xavier Bertrand is refusing (for now) to take part in this vote saying once again he will run an independent centre-right campaign. In truth, all calculations on the centre-right have been overturned by the rise of Zemmour 5/
With a health warning that there is a long way to go, the polls show that all ferment is on the far- & centre-right. Macron is remarkably stable at 24-26% in 1st round voting intentions in all polls. The broad left (incl greens) remain stable at circa 30% but split 6 or 7 ways 6/
On the right, Zemmour’s rise is impressive but misleading. He has taken his support from Le Pen & minor far right candidates plus a chunk of the harder end of the centre right. He can reach the second round if Le Pen melts down further. He CANNOT win there. His negatives = 69% 7/
Zemmour’s rise may be a media bubble. He has not been properly challenged. He has no clear plans for how to implement his pet obsessions. He is causing shock-waves on centre-right bc he is taking away some votes they need to reach second round (where they could beat Macron) 9/
Conclusion: Zemmour’s rise, if it persists, will mean a second term for Macron. If his racist, nasty bubble bursts, as it could, the centre-right might yet beat Macron - but only if they unite behind one candidate. Bertrand? Barnier? Valerie Pécresse? Interesting times
ENDS
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Almost unnoticed, phaps bc it’s done with an English rather than a Hungarian accent, our populist, nationalist PM is setting out to weaken institutions that define a liberal democracy: he’s moving, Orbán style, to make it harder for his Govt to lose power theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
There is a pattern here, if we’re only willing to see it. A populist government hobbling those bodies that exist to keep it in check, trampling on democratic conventions and long-held rights, all to tighten its own grip on power.
We need to recognise it, even when it wears a smile and tousled hair, and speaks in the soothing cadences of Eton College
Germany now faces weeks - if not months - of political uncertainty which creates all sorts of policy risk for Europe. A real danger in the months ahead is a lengthy period without a new voice of any kind in Berlin, just as France plunges into an uncertain election of its own 1/
Because EU faces three extremely big, complex policy questions in the third & fourth quarter this year - over Rule of Law issues with Pol & Hungary; the EU's fiscal orientation in 2023 & how to manage UK escalation over NI Protocol - which are crying out for a political steer 2/
But with a lame-duck Govt now in Berlin, soon to be followed by same in Paris, no major EU policy decisions are likely under either. This risk is the problems fester, escalate & subsequently become harder to resolve 3/
Covid has been good for the EU.
It is now both more cohesive and resilient as a result of the pandemic, compared to before it. But are EU policymakers on the verge of committing another historic fiscal mistake? Thread 1/
Two reasons explain EU’s greater resilience post-Covid
1) The creation of Recovery Fund (RF), which has enabled significant EU-wide borrowing, subsequently transferred to member states as grants. This is facilitating their economic recovery, without increasing their debts 2/
2) Populism has had a bad crisis. This is partly because of RF. Take Italy's case: It's hard to argue against €180bn (10.5% of GDP). Hence the nationalist far-right League led by @matteosalvinimi has largely shut up & entered into reform-oriented coalition led by Mario Draghi 3/
The review to reform EU fiscal rules begins soon. 3 key points: 1/ Process brings risks; 2/ There's an emerging consensus on debt, not investments; 3/ COM is toying with completely overhauling governance - empowering members states to determine their own fiscal trajectories 1/
Process is key - & brings risks. Member states must submit Stability & Convergence Programs to Bxl by mid-Apr. For this they'll need an idea of what fiscal rules in 2023 will be. But we'll only have a new Govt in Berlin in.. Dec? Maybe Jan? That leaves Q1 next yr to do a deal 2/
Absent consensus, COM may be forced to issue a Communique - instead of concrete legislative proposals - pointing to what new rules will likely be. It's here when fiscal hawks (@VDombrovskis is key) will likely urge old rules & EDPs to apply - despite tightening they imply 3/
So it's good there's a compromise over social care. But the bigger picture has been totally lost in the details of today's debate - namely that the UK is already aiming at tighter fiscal policy, while ROW & certainly the EU remains very focussed on supporting the econ recovery 1/
This is largely borne out of differences between @BorisJohnson and @RishiSunak. The PM wants to spend on levelling up, subsidising net-zero, new manifesto commitments and much more besides. He has his eye on the Red Wall 2/
Sunak thinks spending was ALREADY too high pre ~£400bn Govt has spent on Covid relief & is worried about debt servicing costs (given BoE projections of 4% inflation). He also wants to (re)build the party's credibility on fiscal policy vs Labour & is channeling Tory members 3/