Gas is getting a lot of flak in today’s energy crisis—and for good reason. This is a genuine gas crisis. But the criticism can also miss a deeper truth: gas has a really tough assignment. The hardest, in fact. Let’s talk about *seasonal* balancing.
We often think of gas as balancing intermittent renewables, and sure it can do that. But its chief function in many modern economies is to manage seasonal variations in demand. And these can huge.
In the UK, for example, the winter/summer spread for gas demand is over 2x. For electricity the ratio is about 35 percent. This is fairly typical in countries where gas is used for space heating (in the U.S., the gas spread is about 75 percent, electricity about 35 percent).
Back in the day, the UK met this seasonal swing by flexing production up and down. But as North Sea production declined, so did the ability to ramp up production during the winter. Given its limited storage, the UK now relies on imports for seasonal balancing.
But not all imports are the same. Imports from Norway are steady and seasonally predictable. The trade with Continental Europe is more erratic and subject to market dynamics. And LNG is all over the place. This is the main challenge—not import dependence per se.
This reliance on LNG is especially problematic because LNG is not seasonally flexible—and whatever flexibility exists is usually soaked up by Asia. As LNG overtakes, on the margin, domestic production and pipeline trade, this seasonality issue becomes more acute.
Over time, this seasonal challenge will change. Electrification will provide efficiency gains and reduce demand. Perhaps demand response will get better. But you still need to balance the electricity system seasonally—and that’s a challenge that batteries are ill suited for.
There are solutions, of course. France uses nuclear for seasonal balancing. Lots of countries use hydro. But gas plays a key role. And even if you replace gas with, say, hydrogen, you run into the same storage and deliverability challenges—who ensures the reliability of hydrogen?
So yes, blame gas for the current crisis; but don’t forget that gas has a tough assignment. And we don’t have great solutions to manage big seasonal variations. And *that’s* the problem to solve—not gas per se. Fin.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Nikos Tsafos

Nikos Tsafos Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @ntsafos

5 Jan
For years, I distrusted sidewalks. I grew up in Athens, where sidewalks are cramped, cracked, or just missing. I learned to walk on the street, something I had to “un-learn” after moving overseas. But I spent time in Athens recently, and it all came back. A thread—on sidewalks.
First rule: sidewalks are *not* for pedestrians. They function chiefly as overflow parking. If there is enough space on the sidewalk, a car or motorcycle will appear. Vehicles win—every time. (Photos taken around Alimos and Palaio Faliro.)
The next barrier is the trash can. The urban planner has often firmed its place on the sidewalk with this little insert. Good luck squeezing past these guys.
Read 10 tweets
8 Dec 20
Whenever I write about Turkey and the East Med, I get a gazillion replies with the same message: look at this MAP! So many problems can be traced to this map—and the feeling it is meant to create that Turkey is a victim in the East Med. Let’s talk about this map.
To begin with, it’s not really a map of “Greek claims in the eastern Med.” Greek officials do not show this map. In fact, they rarely show maps at all. You won’t find it in official documents. This map is a derivation; it is not an official, stated “claim.”
This map is an academic exercise about what a median-line approach to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) might look like. It is based on the idea that absent any agreement to the contrary, each island gets the full EEZ that it is entitled to by international law. That’s it.
Read 16 tweets
14 Sep 20
There is always so much interesting stuff in the @bp_plc energy outlook. Some thoughts on my main take-aways for natural gas. 🧵bp.com/en/global/corp…
At first glance, on slide 5, natural gas looks good: it overtakes coal by 2025 and oil by 2035; renewables surpass it in 2040, but even in 2050, gas is the largest fossil fuel. This supports the thesis that gas will do relatively better in the transition.
But these are percentages. In total consumption, gas defends its position in a rapid transition—growing a bit, then declining a bit. But in a "net zero" world, gas demand is near its peak already. By 2050, consumption is down by a third.
Read 8 tweets
11 Sep 20
The idea that the current tensions in the East Med are due to “decades-old” disputes isn’t entirely right. I am not sure people appreciate how much the Turkey-Libya delimitation created new realities and claims. Let's look at some maps.
My go-to source is always @CErciyes—his slides are excellent and make clear the Turkish position (I’ve added some links at the end of this thread). There is also a certain rhythm to his presentations, which makes them easier to compare over time.
Here is a map from May 2019, before the Turkey-Libya delimitation, showing Turkey’s claimed Continental Shelf. It uses the Turkey-Egypt midpoint and assumes that Kastellorizo has no or reduced effect. It reaches the 28º meridian, and then the firm line becomes a dotted line.
Read 12 tweets
19 Aug 20
So many bad takes on what is going in the East Med, what countries are fighting over, and how energy fits in. The narrative “tensions over energy” is neat, simple—and mostly wrong. Let's break it down.
There are two conflicts: one over Cyprus, the other over the role of islands in determining maritime boundaries, continental shelves, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), etc. And each conflict subsumes several sub-conflicts.
First, Cyprus. Turkey is frustrated by the Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC) hydrocarbon activities; it disputes the right of the RoC to declare EEZs, to issue licenses, to exploit resources, to spend the revenue, etc. This dispute has nothing to do with sea boundaries.
Read 21 tweets
29 Jul 20
Every week, there are a few stories on my timeline about Greece, Turkey and energy in the East Med. They tend to say the same thing; I mostly gloss over them. But there are three things that drive me nuts in how people talk about this issue. Pardon the rant.
First, I wish people would stop saying that Turkey is “exploring.” Exploring implies a target, some, you know, exploring and, eventually, results. Turkey isn’t *really* sending ships where it might find hydrocarbons—and I never hear of any actual results (are there?).
Now, Turkey is pretending to explore, of course—mostly to annoy, I think. But that’s like saying someone is “working out” because they follow some fitness accounts on Instagram and bought fancy clothes and new shoes. Put “exploring” in quotes, please.
Read 8 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(