The most significant reforms Deng Xiaoping carried out were vertical decentralization and aggressive depoliticization: localities were isolated from the top and anything bubbling up from there could be evaluated through the logic of marketization and given ex post facto approval.
This was making official the lay of the land through the 1970s, when decentralization and depoliticization were already underway. Factional politics at the top, but commune and brigade enterprises and other novel organizations thriving down below. It only had to legitimized.
The Two Initiatives that formed the theoretical basis of Mao's own attempt at devolution of powers in the 1950s (after being forced to liquidate Gao Gang and Rao Shushi) were written into the 1982 Constitution. This created the most complex, dynamic modern political system.
Without a clear constitutional framework (except for that theoretical note on devolution of powers), cadres and their governments are self-funded, operating like radical cells or distributed ganglia. This is "adaptive authoritarianism"; this is "laboratories of democracy."
Privatizing the township and village enterprises is unconstitutional, probably. Holding competitive elections might be, too. But that's unclear. The only thing that's clear is this: the Party incentivizes experimentation (as long as there's minimal stability).
At a certain point, this can cause chaos. If there's factional competition at the top, as there was after Jiang Zemin officially departed, there's minimal direction and not enough reward for positive innovation. That helps explain centralization of power after 2011.
That doesn't completely explain it, however. Xi Jinping (and here this is just the name for the current Party elite) is headed for a new paradigm of individualized governance through Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. The local cadre manager will no longer be crucial.
Xi Jinping promoting rule of law is a way to ensure this system to tame the localities. There will be a firm constitutional framework to limit excesses. It's also part of digital social governance. Artificial intelligence will be the supreme arbiter of the law.
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Wang Huning is described as making a "daring break from the materialism of orthodox Marxism" in the idea that social "software" shapes its "hardware." I want to say a few things about this. palladiummag.com/2021/10/11/the…
For the break from Marxist orthodoxy on economic determinism in Chinese political theory, we should go back to the 1930s, at least. Mao tells us that political and cultural changes can become crucial. This was his idea of a cultural revolution, decades before 1966.
Culture is a reflection of politics and economics, Mao says in 1940, but the former has a "tremendous influence and effect upon the latter." Mao repeatedly argues this is not a break from Marxist orthodoxy. You can decide for yourself. It was less of a break from Lenin, for sure.
This is Huang Haihua 黄海华, the style is pingtan 评弹, and he is singing from an opera called Finding Mother in a Nunnery 庵堂认母. The subtitles are imperfect but I hope they will give you the general idea of what he is singing about.
The tense in the subtitles could be adjusted, I believe. But, again, you get the general idea: he is an orphan, raised by another woman, but, after finding a note his mother wrote in her own blood, hinting at his parentage in riddles, he realizes the truth and vows to find her.
I don't have it in me to do anymore, but you should hear Zhang Jianzhen 张建珍 sing, giving us his mother's point of view. The nun—Zhizhen 智贞—is upset by the arrival of her son at the convent. She knows it's him, but to admit that would harm her reputation and hurt his career.
A United States Information Service production, Korean Cultural Goodwill Mission to Southeast Asia (1958) was part of an effort to build mutual understanding among "free people of Asia" and showcase American empire with Korea as second-in-command. Saigon, Manila, Hong Kong...
And here's Taipei, the capital of Free China. Han Sang Kim writes: Korean "self-awareness as second-in-command and their sense of superiority over Southeast Asian people are both cinematically exercised." But it's also USIS "showing off its power to see and visualize."
"...[T]he governmentality of Cold War Asia was
formed through a process of inheriting the basic structure established in colonial regimes of knowledge and redetermining the relationship between the newly independent states and the U.S. in the new world order."
Paul Engle holds forth in this documentary—Community of the Imagination (1973)—funded by the United States Information Agency, covering a residency at the International Writing Program. This idea of a cultural battlefield is mostly gone, I think, or it's much less sophisticated.
Robert Blum of the CIA-operated Asia Foundation pushed the United States to become a patron of the arts. Creativity was a bulwark against communism (as was the healthy nationalism of folk arts, an important aspect here). Paul and Nieh Hua-ling took up the project.
Nieh Hua-ling helped shape how literary translation was conceived of in the United States. The process she describes here—essentially bridge translation, with the final product handed off to an "American writer" who puts it in "publishable form"—is still standard practice.
Everyone enjoying Wang Huning's America Against America, either in the original or through grassroots scanlation efforts, I recommend another contemporary portrait of America: Beijinger in New York, a TV series adapted from a 1991 novel about a sojourn in America.
The series came at a moment not completely unlike the present, when the West was making a show of turning its back on China, while things and money and people were still going back and forth. So, this is about a lot of things—but the portrait of America is interesting...
America is corrosive. Our protagonist—Qiming (Jiang Wen)—a shaggy but humane and cultured musician is destroyed: he's reduced to a beast of burden, his wife starts sleeping with her boss (white, sleazy missionary grandson, fluent in Chinese), and his daughter is hooked on dope.
This is an essay about online politics by Wang Taotao 王陶陶. He says, basically: ideological confrontation with the West has sped up the decline of Chinese liberalism, and a generation born decades on from Reform and Opening are unenthusiastic about the market economy.
Identified with openness to the West, liberalism is untenable in an age of conflict with the United States. He compares the decline of liberalism to the decline of pan-Asianism in the '30s and the shock delivered to pro-Soviet intellectuals in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split.
The second factor is a generational split: people born in the '60s, '70s, even to some extent the '80s were beneficiaries of Reform and Opening, when a college degree was a ticket to the good life. This is no longer the case. There is increasing skepticism of the market economy.