The Polish rule of law crisis obviously matters. But I don’t think this article by @SBarrettBar offers much help in understanding it or what (if any) U.K. “angle” to it there might be.
The article talks about the “Brexit deal” in a loose way: but it is (and to be fair makes clear when you read it thoroughly) that it’s talking about the TCA. So forget any thought that it might be relevant to the current government’s attacks on the NI Protocol that it negotiated.
The point being made is that Article 693 of the TCA (minor gripe: the piece uses the old numbering not the now correct one) allows either side to suspend the part of the TCA dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
It can do so “in response to serious and systemic deficiencies within [the other] Party as regards the protection of fundamental rights or the principle of the rule of law”.
As far as the U.K. is concerned this is only interesting if we want to suspend eg extradition arrangements. If we don’t (and we probably don’t) this is irrelevant to anything practical. (The article states that practicality is a political question which it doesn’t want to touch.)
There *is* a strictly legal question which the article assumes has an obvious answer but actually doesn’t, when you think about it.
*From the point of view of this part of the TCA* (the correct perspective: thinking about eg extradition) is there a “serious and systemic” breakdown of rule of law *in the EU* because of the ruling of a “constitutional court” of 1/27 Member States?
The article attempts to link the ruling of the Polish “constitutional court” to the controversial ruling of the German constitutional court earlier this year. But they very different as this article explains (sorry only in German).
One problem here is that any suggestion that the U.K. might be able to run any argument to escape its obligations under the WA (or TCA) generates excitement. But any such excitement here has no solid basis.
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This article has as its thesis the idea that “triggering Article 16” would require legislation in order to avoid a “clash with the judges”. But it isn’t explained why. telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/…
The domestic legal position is that, under s7A of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 (a new section added in 2020 as part of implementing Johnson’s “oven ready deal” on which he won the election) the Withdrawal Agreement is supreme in U.K. law. Including the Protocol.
The effect of that is that, essentially, as matters stand any power exercised by Ministers will be, in domestic law, of no legal effect if it infringes the Protocol. The courts could (and would have to) quash any such measure or declare it unlawful.
In which Martin Howe QC reveals why a U.K. Bill of rights won’t happen. Because our “priority as a nation” would be a right to free health care at the point of need. A priority that no Tory government would ever agree should have constitutional force. telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/10/0…
NB too that “strengthening free speech” would of necessity include strengthening the right to speak in objection to others’ speech (and to refuse to hear their speech or urge boycotts of those who publish their speech).
Ultimately, a debate about what our constitutional rights should be is not a debate that today’s Tory party (or probably any Tory party) wants to see happen, when it pauses for a moment to think about the issues that it would raise.
1. Use of Article 16 does not “replace the Protocol”: it allows a limited and conditional suspension of parts of it. And for other “problematic” parts (eg Article 10 on State aid) there is no arguable legal basis for Article 16 measures.
Those who call for “triggering Article 16” need first to understand the Article and its limitations. On its own, it’s not a call that makes much sense.
In particular, they need to understand that Art16 is not a simple “trigger” that can be pulled at will along the lines of Article 50 TEU. Nor does it have any general effect on the UK’s obligations under the Protocol (again, unlike Art 50).
Rather, Article 16 is a basis for particular targeted measures that are “strictly necessary”, including in scope and duration, (not just “expedient”) to deal with serious disturbances or trade diversion. They must be the minimum necessary to deal with the issue.
In thinking about what Labour’s policy should be on that there are two sorts of uncertainty. One is uncertainty about where the country will be - and where the public mood will be - in 2 or 3 years time.
That is, to an extent, fair enough: provided it doesn’t stop Labour from trying to shape that mood rather than simply responding to it.
“Free movement of people” is a creation of EU law: part of the single market. It only has meaning as part of the EU or EEA.
But plenty of neighbouring states have agreements allowing wide mobility outside that EU law framework. Very close to home: Ireland and the U.K. Further away: Australia and NZ. And other examples of states allowing wide mobility between them.