Clinton & Obama comparisons are more for 2024 than now. Both suffered massive losses in 1st midterms, linked to congressional agendas. By re-elections, they had both generic incumbency & a radicalized Republican foil (including on economics) to enable visible triangulation
Low-education voters were traditionally inattentive, meaning both lower turnout & more nature-of-the-times voting. We haven’t yet run a low turnout election or a democratic incumbent under education polarization. But basic midterm backlash dynamics may overwhelm other factors
We don’t know yet how Republicans will look in 2024 (including on economics). 1995-6 & 2011-12 Rep internal fighting (including primaries) & public image had a lot to do with Dem successes in 96 & 12. Left/center conflict could matter less or allow triangulation with Rep foil
Obama & Clinton images today are based on post-midterm behavior. In initial years, they were seen (like Biden now) as closely tied with congressional leaders, trying to pass large agendas, & moving policy leftward. Divided government enabled running on triangulation & competence
Trump dynamics could’ve been similar. He lost moderate image by allying with congressional party in 17, but gained opportunity with left-moving Democrats after 18. With any kind of pivot, better econ/pandemic results, or non-Biden opponent, he might have pulled off incumbent win
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There are real trends in the rise & fall of disciplines, but they are slow. Trends in research university tenure-track faculty do not necessarily match trends in the much larger higher education teaching market researchcghe.org/perch/resource…
A big source of inertia is that most research university departments are aging, with assistant professors making up a small share of tenure-track faculty (the social sciences are on the young side) researchcghe.org/perch/resource…
Nice @davidshor overview/debate & 2022/24 election simulation: nytimes.com/2021/10/08/opi…
In my view, Shor's meta point that decision-making by high-education liberal operatives hurts Democrats is more widely important than just recommending popular issue positioning
But nationalization, coalition group emphasis, context effects, ideological sorting, & polarization are all very important trends that are likely to be affected by many party decisions over time
Policy agenda effects are real, though under media control. Policy position effects seem limited & specific to issues where the parties once had muddled positions. But the long-built liberal & nationalized image of the Democratic Party is very important & Dems used to resist it
Media coverage of Congress is overwhelmingly focused on heated conflict. Coverage of social problems can be more substantive, but the focus moves to political conflict once policies are being debated
Process conflict media coverage of Congress tends to reduce bill support & highlight extremism. The dynamic is made worse by the incentives of backbenchers to generate attention on their efforts, which tends to make it harder for leaders to corral votes niskanencenter.org/how-media-cove…
Contentious media coverage can reduce support for bills, but does not always do so. Media coverage of legislative debate never seems to increase support for bills. Coverage of heated conflict is more likely to reduce support
2-track “plan” was not a party agreement; it was a leadership promise with implausible timing made to pass the bipartisan Senate bill followed by another leadership promise with implausible timing made to pass the budget; next is the implausible promise for Monday’s vote or delay
Biden is meeting with everyone today but we don’t know if he is whipping votes for ~Monday or asking to postpone. Seems impossible not to break one of the prior promises. But their tendency is to make more promises to get past the vote in front of them.
Unclear if there was a WH plan today to encourage either yes votes or postponement. If so, it doesn’t appear to have changed much:
Democrats have increasingly focused on appeals to their affiliated identity groups in recent years, without much change among Republicans #polisciresearch diss
The diss finds limited evidence that identity appeals increase affective polarization, though affective polarization is increasing with Democratic diversification. Interestingly, the Republican Party is relatively stable on racial & religious composition escholarship.org/content/qt4k12…
It was a privilege to delve into great progress being made across economics, psychology, sociology, political science, & anthropology & return to fundamental questions in the history & philosophy of science. Thanks @OUPAcademic & all those who helped.
It is more difficult (but not impossible) to reach consensus cumulative knowledge in social sciences, but that is due to the diversity of human experience & the complex, cross-level processes we study, rather than our methods. Social scientists recognize their uphill battle
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