Thread by @robfordmancs

This is also true in Britain - education (and age) polarisation seen now is genuinely new and different. One thing I would add - education polarisation also matters far more because of demographic change. The graduate class has grown drastically in the last 30 years

https://twitter.com/davidshor/status/1447227895169028099

A generation ago, graduates were still over-represented in politics, but they couldn't bend political discussion towards the issues that exercised them most because doing so would be electorally nonsensical in a country where 85-90% of voters were non-graduates

Now, with the share of graduates approaching 40% (and higher still in younger cohorts, in the Labour electoral coalition etc) graduates have a lot more electoral heft - but not enough heft to win.

The graduate class is also large enough to give rise to political monocultures - many grads will live & work in social networks almost entirely comprised of like-minded fellow grads. Political (and media) elite organisations increasingly look like that, esp on the left

All of this creates a similarly troublesome situation for Labour as @davidshor diagnoses for the Dems - Labour is organisationally dominated by socially lbieral grads, whose distinctive views on politics don't resonate with the voters needed to win a majority in today's Britain.

@davidshor The very difficult task I think both Labour and Dems face is persuading very committed, passionate people that their broad political goal is best served by setting aside some of the issues they feel most passionately about, and talking more about things that animate them less.

@davidshor I have other thoughts about this excellent discussion of the Shor diagnosis by @ezraklein in today's NY Times, and which bits of it translate (or don't) to Britain, which I'll try and return to tomorrow (want to think them through): nytimes.com/2021/10/08/opi…

@davidshor @ezraklein Plus my usual reminder that if you're interested in how educational polarisation and the mobilisation of divisive identity issues such as immigration and Brexit have reshaped our politics, @ProfSobolewska and I have a book you'll like!

amazon.co.uk/Brexitland-Ide…

@davidshor @ezraklein @ProfSobolewska There's another problem common to Labour and Dems flagged by @Nate_Cohn in recent work - many of the lower education white voters both parties have lost arguably won't come back. Some of the partisan bonds broken over the last decade are broken for good:

https://twitter.com/Nate_Cohn/status/1447208531820785666

@davidshor @ezraklein @ProfSobolewska @Nate_Cohn Just as, on Cohn's account, going back to 2012 is just not possible for Dems now because too many white non-college voters' partisanship has changed, it may similarly not be possible for Labour to go back to a 1997-2005 style broad tend coalition because same voters have flipped

@davidshor @ezraklein @ProfSobolewska @Nate_Cohn If we have a structural situation where a large chunk of the white, school leaver electorate has gone from a weak, but stable Lab(or Dem) partisan lean to a stronger, more stable Con/Leave (Rep) lean, that is going to make building a new winning coalition even harder.

@davidshor @ezraklein @ProfSobolewska @Nate_Cohn As Cohn observes, simply avoiding or defusing the issues that drove such voters out of the left coalition (in Britain - immigration and Brexit) won't work - you need to have an offer which *actively attracts them back*.

@davidshor @ezraklein @ProfSobolewska @Nate_Cohn But what is the package that both attracts disaffected white school leavers, while still being something that white graduate liberals can not only accept, but actively sell with enthusiasm? Not easy. But without an answer to that Q Lab may not have a route to majority govt.