If you can endure the grave insults to Lithuania, I have to agree on what I’ve heard so far, I should have looked at this after reading God’s Playground and the Isles, since Davies’ ideas of state and national perishability are further fleshed out in VK’s intro.
Davies is very pessimistic on the mid term future of the UK in “The Isles” seeing much of what created the Union as eroded. But you can see where he is coming from with his extensive quoting of Hugh Trevor-Roper
The Intro and Visgothic France have both been good.
But I think his history of the Strathclyde or Dumbarton Rock kingdom is the best prose history that’s been written of the area in English. If it is not, it is still very worth the read/listen. And makes me wish his Isles had been a multivolume done in this style.
I think Davies’ writing on Britain is a style that should be imitated by our side of things, he does quite a lot to demonstrate how a stationary population can remain genetically similar, but still undergo total fundamental cultural, linguistic, and “national” conversions.
He seems, at least for me, to be spelling out the tools of a post liberal national overhaul, and the methods that have worked in the context of the “peoples” of Britain and Ireland.
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This is an excellent guide and overview to how the British Foreign Office saw the World War and Ottoman question, and a great study to see the course of development of policy in real time as opposed to reading intentions backwards.
The ministry drove pulled defeat from the jaws of postwar global US-UK confrontation. Policies towards all War belligerents and allies changed on the closest expediency in the Loyd George government, which continued to play and counterplay itself.
The Late War and Peace chapters have some must read material on the maze of policies and counter polices Lloyd George’s Cabinet thought up or attempted to realize in order for Britain to not lose the war to any of its allies or belligerents.
I thought this was interesting. The genesis of Lithuanian Forrest Brothers and partisan warfare in the WW1 PoW-refugee situation. The attacks on rural German patrols don’t create dedicated anti-partisan units, but I would wager there were many notes taken during this period.
For Kolchak, there was immense pressure on him from the beginning to justify and obtain recognition of his government. He was fighting the Americans and London on this though he had partisans with him. In addition, his domestic legitimacy was tied to the Siberian war effort.
He assumed, that if he could reach the Volga, he could link up with dissatisfied elements of Samara, Tambov, and Kazan governates just like the Czechoslovaks did. He also thought that the Northern axis of Allied forces would divert still more forces away from Siberia or push.
Ironside’s men did not go down the Dvina far enough to affect a rail link with Kolchak that was planned before hand, and the Red Armies, more professional than early 1918 with mass officer reconscription, wasn’t going to make the same mistakes of 1918 especially now.
One thing I tried to get across talking about Woodrow Wilson was that, in spite of everything else you may personally hate about him, and there is a lot, his image of the all powerful executive and the reconciliation history he presents in History of American People was
the closest to an ideology and historiography of American Caesarism forging post Civil War regional and ethnic groups into consolidation into all-American nation. Both FDR and Huey Long ultimately worked within the domestic framework of ending legislative and court government.
Unfortunately, it was the Wilson’s Internationalists with a Messianic vision who won. They would use this vision of world governing progressive institutions to expand control and subvert nations it had decided to more extensively satellite. This was their take away from 1919