Obama was a break with that thinking, and he was understood as such.
For all the discipline, even in 2012, 51 percent of voters thought Obama was more liberal than they were, while only 39 percent thought Romney more conservative than they were.
Obama’s message discipline is important to understanding him, and I've emphasized it myself, including in our interview earlier this year.
But that's taking Obama in the context of this moment, more than in the context of his own. nytimes.com/2021/06/01/opi…
Obama's caution was a corrective to the sides of his candidacy that brought liberals out in droves. You have to see Obama as a whole, not as just one of his strategic choices.
I'd add that I think the truly underplayed part of Obama’s politics is his level of rhetorical patriotism, and his genius at wrapping his candidacy in a highly pro-American story.
I think that, more than moderation, is what liberals and leftists underestimate in his success.
At any rate:
A candidate who mirrors Obama’s message discipline but doesn’t push the ideological and historic boundaries Obama pushed at that time, and who didn't have the ineffable thing Obama had that excited so many people, would not perform like Obama did.
Eh, this thread is long enough. I’ll do Unpopularism later!
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Okay, time for some thoughts on "unpopularism," which is the closest I have to a synthesis in this conversation.
In short, the missing piece of popularism is what I’d call agenda control. Agenda control requires controversy. You can’t achieve it if you’re afraid to offend.
The media is attracted to controversy. Controversy requires large or powerful groups to be both opposed ands interested.
Most of the time, that requires some degree of unpopularity in your ideas.
I’m skeptical that polling is that useful a guide to issue popularity, particularly on new issues.
I think it’s more reliable as a guide to which party is favored on broad issue areas, like health care or immigration.
The debate over how Dems can win more seats through messaging — whether popularism or viralism or something else — reflect them proving unable to deploy my preferred strategy: Winning more seats through governing.
This was my first feature at the Times. In some ways, the Shor piece reflects an admission that Democrats aren't going to pull this strategy off. nytimes.com/2021/01/21/opi…
But two points of realism:
1. 50 Dems, given Manchin and Sinema, were not enough to pass many of the policies I'd prefer. That's why winning more seats matters.
2. The policy feedback loop is weaker than I'd like to admit. Child Tax Credit didn't drive Biden's numbers up.
Shor should speak for himself here, but I started thinking this was true and ended thinking that the difference is that the DLC/Third Way version of moderation had strong ideological commitments popularism doesn't share.
I speak to this very quickly in the piece, but I think it's an important distinction:
The DLC version of moderation, or the Manchin/Sinema version, is about creating a vibe of independence by siding with corporate or status quo interests against progressives.
They'll deploy that strategy against *highly* popular initiatives.
A consistent dynamic right now is Democrats lose elections and obsess about why they lost, and how they could change, and Republicans lose elections and...don't.
But the California recall should really be a moment of reflection for them.
One problem with the way narrativize elections is we focus on the flowers, not the soil. That is to say: We look at candidates as independent of the voters that choose them. But they’re not.
And Elder really, really wasn’t.
He wasn’t endorsed by the CA GOP. He didn't have institutional backing.
He had name recognition, and his Trumpy approach reflected what the CA Republican base wanted.
And that terrified the rest of California, and led to a complete collapse in recall support.
Just one example: The forerunner to SB9, SB1120, had died a few months before, when the Assembly passed it minutes before the clock stopped, and so the Senate couldn't vote on it.