SHORT THREAD. This is a great thread from @C_M_Dougherty about what a Taiwan Strait conflict might look like and the Army's role therein. But I have a quibble.
My quibble is with this tweet in particular. IMO, whether a war is short, sharp, and relatively limited or China goes big and hard and broad, this will be a war to define the future of Asia.
Imagine a short war in which China is victorious. In such a scenario, the US would have either sat out the conflict, arguably proving itself a paper tiger, or would have seen its military defeated in conflict with the PLA.
Either set of circumstances would significantly undermine the US alliance system in Asia and embolden China to act even more assertively vis-à-vis its neighbors.
Then there are the strategic benefits China would reap from conquering strategic geography in the W. Pacific. China would be able to more readily threaten Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, & CONUS. PRC control of TW would make JPN more difficult to defend & facilitate PRC control of the SCS.
A short conflict over Taiwan might not be a war for all the marbles--but it would be a war for a lot of them. /END
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THREAD.@RepElaineLuria writes today for the @washingtonpost, arguing that "it is time to untie the hands of our president so that he can, in fact, carry through with the 'rock solid' commitment to Taiwan if actions by China require it." There is precedent for this. 1/x
Following Zhou Enlai's Aug 1954 assertion that Taiwan must be "liberated," the PLA began shelling Jinmen. Fighting eventually spread to Quemoy and Matsu that fall. As the risk of war grew, the US & the ROC finished negotiating their mutual defense treaty, signed on 12/2/54. 2/x
That treaty, however, would not be ratified until Feb 1955 and would not come into force until March 1955. Concerned about that interlude, Eisenhower requested that Congress provide him with pre-authorization to use force to defend Taiwan. 3/x
THREAD. Ok, folks. Sit back & strap in. Let's take a ride through history as we explore the US position on Taiwan's status, shall we? (Note: as inspiring as I may find @pptsapper's work, I've yet to have lunch, so this history will be entirely sober. Please accept my apologies.)
Our first stop: May 8, 1895. On that day, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War, comes into force. In the treaty, China ceded "Formosa" (among other things) to Japan. Stick a pin in this; we'll be back.
Fast forward to August 17, 1945, when Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, issues General Order No. 1. Note how Formosa is listed as something apart from China. In October, US naval vessels ferried ROC troops to Taiwan to accept the surrender of JPN forces.
Why is the US commitment to Taiwan "rock-solid" and why must it remain so? I explain in the latest Indo-Pacific Perspectives roundtable from the Air Force's Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs @journalofindopacific @aupress 1/x
In my latest for @globaltaiwan, I tackle @mikepompeo's controversial nullification of the Taiwan contact guidelines. There are two contexts in which to assess the decision, which lead to dueling assessments of the policy move. Join me on my journey. aei.org/articles/asses…
Context 1: Pompeo has future political ambitions. He never fully subscribed to the view that, as chief diplomat, he should refrain from engaging in domestic politics. He showed disregard for traditional strictures on the secretary of state's conduct and comportment.
That is why it is so hard to believe that future political considerations were not at least partly responsible for Pompeo's flurry of late-in-the-game policy announcements.