Another Sunday, another Sunday Telegraph story demonstrating the fragile state of respect for the rule of law on the part of the UK Government. The Justice Secretary's apparent plans raise three key constitutional concerns. (1)
First, it sounds like the Government is reopening the question of judicial review 'reform'. That isn't in itself problematic: JR isn't perfect and there's no inherently 'right' balance between executive/legislative autonomy and judicial overview. (2)
But we should be concerned if the Government is inclined to reduce the courts' judicial review powers simply because courts make decisions that it finds uncomfortable. Government's willingness to accept such discomfort is a prerequisite in a rule of law based democracy. (3)
Second, Raab says 'we want the [UK] Supreme Court to have the last word ... not the Strasbourg Court'. This implies a similar mindset to the one unpinning last week's story about possibility of blowing up the NI Protocol with respect to the role of the EU Court of Justice. (4)
That mindset assumes the UK can legislate its way out of its international law obligations. As I argued in this piece, that view is based on a legally illiterate form of British exceptionalism founded on a misunderstanding of parliamentary sovereignty. (5) publiclawforeveryone.com/2021/10/10/leg…
As with the NI Protocol, the UK is bound in international law by its obligations under the ECHR. Article 46(1) requires the UK to abide by judgments of the Strasbourg Court. Saying in UK legislation that it is otherwise will not change the position in international law. (6)
Third, Raab wants to 'protect Parliament' from 'judicial legislation', 'abroad or indeed at home'. So the objection is not just to *foreign* judges 'interfering' — it's an objection to *judges* interfering. But what is considered to be undue interference here? (7)
Drill down, and we find that judicial interference essentially means 'courts interpreting the law in a way the Government doesn't like'. (8)
There's no constitutional problem, whether in separation of powers or rule of law terms, if Parliament legislates to change the law if it wishes to secure an outcome different from current law as interpreted by courts (as long as it's not done retroactively). (9)
Is Raab suggesting going further here? He wants a 'mechanism' to allow the Government to introduce 'ad hoc legislation' to 'correct' court judgments that *ministers* consider to be 'incorrect'. But it's already open to Parliament to legislate whenever it wants. (10)
If, then, he's actually proposing that *ministers* should have broad powers to make *secondary* legislation 'correcting' court judgments, then this is profoundly problematic. Indeed, it turns constitutional principle on its head. (11)
In a different context, the Supreme Court (in the Evans case) said of a power allowing ministers to veto judicial decisions that it would undermine fundamental aspects of the rule of law. (12)
It isn't clear if Raab's proposal would go this far or be limited to prospectively 'correcting' interpretations of legislation that ministers don't like. But a ministerial power to do this would itself be deeply troubling, by reassigning a basic judicial role to ministers. (13)
Ultimately, this all strikes me as part of a project to enhance executive supremacy — an 'executive power project', if you will — by treating courts (whether 'foreign' or domestic) as unwelcome interlopers, all masquerading as an attempt to 'protect Parliament'. (14)
In reality, however, it would be the executive that was the principal beneficiary of changes such as these, with basic standards of constitutional governance being the loser. (15/15)
I've expanded on the thoughts set out in this thread in a short video:

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More from @ProfMarkElliott

10 Oct
Very helpful thread. As George notes, govt's 'new objection of dogma/principle to the role of the CJEU cannot plausibly be fitted into Article 16. Where are the “serious difficulties” or “diversion of trade” being caused by its role?' (1)
Hence the need for legislation: Government would be overriding — ie *breaching* — Article 16, not exercising its powers *under* Article 16. UK legislation could make this lawful as a matter of domestic law *but not as a matter of international law*. (2)
This would raise precisely sort of rule-of-law-based and reputational concerns that arose when the Internal Market Bill was first introduced — concerns that arise from a form of British exceptionalism arising from misplaced faith in 'parliamentary sovereignty'.(3)
Read 6 tweets
2 Jan
I should stop describing things like this as ‘extraordinary’: they’re becoming depressing commonplace, but I find it difficult, and don’t wish, to reconcile myself to that fact. /1
I don’t pretend to understand fully why conditions have developed that facilitate this sort of post-truth politics, and am conscious that others have thought and written about this carefully. But to some extent at least, the causes must include constitutional ones. /2
It’s increasingly clear that the Government is seeking to insulate itself from effective scrutiny, including by Parliament (see, eg, unlawful prorogation in 2019) and the courts (see, eg, current ‘independent’ review of judicial review). /3 publiclawforeveryone.com/2020/08/03/the…
Read 6 tweets
30 Dec 20
I’m grateful to @thetimes for referring to my comments on the EU (Future Relationship) Bill. /1
In my comments, I focussed on the very unusual technique adopted in clause 29, which requires UK law to be read and applied as if it has been modified in line with the future relationship Agreements even if it has not actually been modified. /2
That approach, although it’s not wholly unprecedented and shares something in common with the direct effect provisions in the ECA 1972 and the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act, creates significant concerns regarding clarity and legal certainty - ie establishing what the law is. /3
Read 9 tweets
29 Dec 20
This, from the so called ERG star chamber, exhibits impressive levels of cognitive dissonance. /1 lawyersforbritain.org/wp-content/upl…
Their position appears to be that EU membership was incompatible with UK sovereignty (it wasn’t) but that the future relationship agreement is fine because the UK can is bound either to amend domestic law or accept tariffs in relevant circumstances. /2
Their fundamental error is to assume that sovereignty is a binary concept that is either possessed or not. In reality it is a resource that each State can deploy as it chooses, balancing the cost of limiting freedom of action against the benefits that accrue from doing so. /3
Read 4 tweets
29 Dec 20
Cl 29 of the Future Relationship Bill is certainly interesting. If I’ve understood correctly, it is, in effect, an automatic Henry VIII clause that requires existing domestic law to be treated as subject to the Agreements to the extent that they have not been implemented.
By automatic Henry VIII clause, I mean that cl 29 has the effect of requiring us to proceed as if domestic law had been amended via a Henry VIII power in circumstances where it has not been amended but where amendment is needed to implement the Agreements.
That does not strike me as ideal from a legal certainty perspective. But I guess it’s an acknowledgment that there may not be time to make all necessary changes to domestic law by more conventional means.
Read 7 tweets
17 Sep 20
A second short thread on the Government’s proposed amendments to the Internal Market Bill — this time looking at what is said about judicial review. /…
Clause 45 contains what has widely been taken to be an ouster clause, i.e. ousting the courts’ capacity to judicially review regulations made under clauses 42 & 43. They are given effect ‘notwithstanding’ incompatibility with a wide variety of forms of law. /…
In particular, the reference in clause 45(4) to ‘any rule of domestic law whatsoever’ seems, on the face of it, to rule out judicial review on normal grounds. /…
Read 14 tweets

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