One point made well: the claim that it is somehow illegitimate for those who have “lost the [political] argument” to assert their legal rights is highly peculiar.
Take a case where a local authority, having entered into a contract eg to allow an organisation wanting to hold a conference to use its premises, decides (after a highly charged but fully democratic vote) that it doesn’t want to honour the contract.
Would the organisation be condemned by the AG if it tried to enforce its contract? Does she think that the courts should slam their doors to such a claim?
The “politics by other means” complaint doesn’t usually contemplate that sort of case. Which rather shows that the heart of the complaint isn’t really about overstepping the law/politics mark.
Rather, it’s a complaint about the existence or content of certain kinds of legal rights: rights that those making the criticism tend to regard as over-extended, less important, or even objectionable - at least when invoked against a government they support.
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Indeed. These list the the areas of EU law that still apply to the UK in respect of Northern Ireland. (NB that in some cases - eg State aid - EU law applies to some UK or even GB measures if they affect NI.)
This is the idea - taken from the proposed model for 🇨🇭.
Interested that I was quoted with approval by @melanielatest in this piece (not least because she blocked me on Twitter some years ago for disagreeing with her). thetimes.co.uk/article/domini…
Some sensible points in the piece (including of course that one).
But the idea that the “UK” system of common law (sorry, Scotland) created the “purest form of liberty in the world” is … dodgy. (Ask eg a Windrush victim, or someone on low wages who wants to live with their foreign wife in the U.K.)
I agree with this thread (though there are real issues with the design of a scrutiny process - and a serious risk, very real with the current government - of executive interference).
The temptation is to pretend that court composition doesn’t matter and that judges don’t vary - on grounds that are “political” in any meaningful sense - in their approach to questions of how the law should apply in human rights cases or cases raising big societal questions.
The problem with that pretence is that it just isn’t true: and it’s always a bad idea to rely on a proposition that isn’t true.
I’m not knowledgeable enough about NI politics to speak confidently about them, but it’s worth noting why some issues raised by the current UK government (in some cases for the first time) in its July paper aren’t playing out as practical problems on the ground there.
No need to comment on this as there is nothing in it that is new or, apart from the irrelevant quotes from Burke, even interesting. The only thing worth commenting on would be the legal text that is being kept from us.
Because, as we know, it is legal text, not fluffy rhetoric, that matters.
But on the fluffy rhetoric: I don’t see much hope of a better relationship with the EU until we (a) admit the current government’s trust-destroying blunders to date and (b) stop lecturing our democratic neighbours on our allegedly greater democratic credentials.
The Polish rule of law crisis obviously matters. But I don’t think this article by @SBarrettBar offers much help in understanding it or what (if any) U.K. “angle” to it there might be.
The article talks about the “Brexit deal” in a loose way: but it is (and to be fair makes clear when you read it thoroughly) that it’s talking about the TCA. So forget any thought that it might be relevant to the current government’s attacks on the NI Protocol that it negotiated.
The point being made is that Article 693 of the TCA (minor gripe: the piece uses the old numbering not the now correct one) allows either side to suspend the part of the TCA dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal matters.