I’m not knowledgeable enough about NI politics to speak confidently about them, but it’s worth noting why some issues raised by the current UK government (in some cases for the first time) in its July paper aren’t playing out as practical problems on the ground there.
On VAT there has as yet been little U.K. divergence: and in any event VAT systems round the world work much the same way. Differences of rates may vary in due course: but these may not matter hugely (tax variations across sub national borders are frequent and unproblematic).
State aid: as yet no controversial decisions or court cases. And the core current government concern isn’t about NI anyway: it’s about the effect of Article 10 on UK wide measures, or measures centred on GB.
Governance: no case anywhere near the ECJ yet or in prospect. And is the difference between ECJ resolution and resolution by some other international arbitration body really a major point for anyone other than lawyers and dogmatists?
(NB that it was not discernibly raised by anyone much before the July command paper.)
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No need to comment on this as there is nothing in it that is new or, apart from the irrelevant quotes from Burke, even interesting. The only thing worth commenting on would be the legal text that is being kept from us.
Because, as we know, it is legal text, not fluffy rhetoric, that matters.
But on the fluffy rhetoric: I don’t see much hope of a better relationship with the EU until we (a) admit the current government’s trust-destroying blunders to date and (b) stop lecturing our democratic neighbours on our allegedly greater democratic credentials.
The Polish rule of law crisis obviously matters. But I don’t think this article by @SBarrettBar offers much help in understanding it or what (if any) U.K. “angle” to it there might be.
The article talks about the “Brexit deal” in a loose way: but it is (and to be fair makes clear when you read it thoroughly) that it’s talking about the TCA. So forget any thought that it might be relevant to the current government’s attacks on the NI Protocol that it negotiated.
The point being made is that Article 693 of the TCA (minor gripe: the piece uses the old numbering not the now correct one) allows either side to suspend the part of the TCA dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
This article has as its thesis the idea that “triggering Article 16” would require legislation in order to avoid a “clash with the judges”. But it isn’t explained why. telegraph.co.uk/politics/2021/…
The domestic legal position is that, under s7A of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 (a new section added in 2020 as part of implementing Johnson’s “oven ready deal” on which he won the election) the Withdrawal Agreement is supreme in U.K. law. Including the Protocol.
The effect of that is that, essentially, as matters stand any power exercised by Ministers will be, in domestic law, of no legal effect if it infringes the Protocol. The courts could (and would have to) quash any such measure or declare it unlawful.
In which Martin Howe QC reveals why a U.K. Bill of rights won’t happen. Because our “priority as a nation” would be a right to free health care at the point of need. A priority that no Tory government would ever agree should have constitutional force. telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/10/0…
NB too that “strengthening free speech” would of necessity include strengthening the right to speak in objection to others’ speech (and to refuse to hear their speech or urge boycotts of those who publish their speech).
Ultimately, a debate about what our constitutional rights should be is not a debate that today’s Tory party (or probably any Tory party) wants to see happen, when it pauses for a moment to think about the issues that it would raise.
1. Use of Article 16 does not “replace the Protocol”: it allows a limited and conditional suspension of parts of it. And for other “problematic” parts (eg Article 10 on State aid) there is no arguable legal basis for Article 16 measures.
Those who call for “triggering Article 16” need first to understand the Article and its limitations. On its own, it’s not a call that makes much sense.
In particular, they need to understand that Art16 is not a simple “trigger” that can be pulled at will along the lines of Article 50 TEU. Nor does it have any general effect on the UK’s obligations under the Protocol (again, unlike Art 50).
Rather, Article 16 is a basis for particular targeted measures that are “strictly necessary”, including in scope and duration, (not just “expedient”) to deal with serious disturbances or trade diversion. They must be the minimum necessary to deal with the issue.