Thread by @HerzogSM

Thread 1/16

In a new survey experiment article now published in @The_JOP, with @RDavisGibbons & @JonathonBaron, we test the relative strength of elite vs. group cues in shaping US public opinion on nuclear politics. doi.org/10.1086/714924

2/16

So far, opinion surveys and survey experiments by scholars have primarily assessed public support for using nuclear weapons in conflict or engaging in nuclear proliferation. We now turn to survey experimental research on nuclear disarmament in our article.

3/16

For nuclear surveys see e.g. @Lauren_Sukin @charlicarpenter @Koch_LL @MichalSmetana3 @NKnowledges @doreen__h @RealTylerBowen @MichaelGoldfien @Matt__Graham @PaulCAvey @OndrejRosendorf @mVranka @NaomiEgel @lincolnhines @ProfOnderco @kjolvegeland @jiyoung_ko @JoshuaASchwartz

4/16

RE: our @The_JOP article: Last year, @RDavisGibbons and I previewed some results of this study in @monkeycageblog.

The 2021 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, #NuclearBan) draws baseline support from 64.7% of the US public. washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/…

5/16

Yet, we show in @The_JOP, when Americans are exposed to treatments mirroring real-world US government elite cues critiquing the TPNW on various substantive grounds, or to antinormative group cues (drawing on @jkertzer & @zeitzoff), support drops substantially.

6/16

So what’s stronger, elite or group antinormative cues? Elite critiques of #NuclearBan on security or institutional grounds weaken support by 17 to 19.2%. Elite cues claiming the Ban will undermine NPT norms drop support by 8.6%, indistinguishable from group cues at 8.1%.

7/16

In practice, cues normally work in tandem to strike a chord with diverse audiences and there’s advocate-opponent push-pull. That said, the strength of some critiques of the TPNW’s emerging nuclear nonpossession norm show the importance of winning information battles.

8/16

It seems like, RE: the Ban specifically, nuclear disarmament advocates have their work cut out for them among the US population. High baseline support, in principle, isn’t sufficient if the goal is to change public attitudes.

9/16

Both types of cues significantly drop support. Does that mean Americans don’t actually support nuclear disarmament? Not so. Even a majority of respondents who don’t back the Ban (in both the baseline and all treatment groups) are negative, on average, toward nuclear arms.

10/16

Because knowledge of the TPNW may be low among the US public, we also ran a follow-up @YouGov study to unpack some of these dynamics.

We asked respondents: "Have you heard of a recent international treaty designed to ban nuclear weapons and make them illegal?"

11/16

Answer choices were:
-"Yes, and I support it."
-"Yes, and I oppose it."
-"No, but it sounds like I would support it."
-"No, but it sounds like I would oppose it."

12/16

Unsurprisingly, the US public is deeply unfamiliar with the TPNW. Only 26.1% of respondents said they have heard of it. 73.9% said they have not.

13/16

Overt support for the treaty is high among those who claim knowledge. 69.6% of respondents who have heard of the TPNW support it, compared to 30.4% who have heard of it and oppose the Ban.

14/16

Latent support is also high. 60.2% of respondents who haven't heard of the TPNW said it sounds like an agreement they would support. 39.8% said it sounds like they would oppose it.

15/16

Overall, we find strong overt and latent support for the TPNW among the US public. But the fact that cues can change public opinion on the #NuclearBan so strongly is surprising.

16/16

Compare the public opinion/knowledge climate in the United States to that of Japan, with a very different nuclear history, where such antinormative cues do not have the same efficacy. doi.org/10.1080/257516…