Thread by @ShaharHameiri

NEW: @DrLeeJones and my book, Fractured China: How State Transformation is Shaping China's Rise, is now out! Here is a 🧵 to explain what it is about. 1/ cambridge.org/core/books/fra…

Fractured China intervenes in the International Relations (and foreign policy) debate over whether China's rise will be a threat to the international order. China's international behaviour is sometimes revisionist and sometimes preserving the status-quo. 2/

IR and foreign policy analysis approaches struggle to explain this inconsistency because they treat China as a unitary actor in international politics. The debate has stalled and become speculative, turning on to claims about China will do or become in the future. 3/

At its core, this book’s argument is simple: China’s international engagements often exhibit inconsistent or even contradictory behaviour because China today is not a unitary international actor. 4/

Decades of state transformation - the fragmentation, decentralisation and internationalisation of party-state apparatuses - mean that many Chinese actors, w/ often differing interests & agendas now act internationally w/ considerable autonomy & limited coordination & oversight 5/

This builds on the empirical research of many China experts who have identified the pluralisation of China's policymaking and implementation processes over many years. They have often not theorised their findings and therefore IR scholars have neglected their work. 6/

In Ch 1, we go further and develop our framework for understanding how foreign policymaking and implementation occur in today's China, which we call the 'Chinese-style regulatory state'. 7/

We outline our understanding of the state, based on Gramscian state theory. We then trace the rise of a powerful, but divided, cadre-capitalist class from the start of reform in 1978. Struggles b/w different factions manifest as conflicts b/w different parts of the party-state 8/

China's huge social, political & economic changes have been faciliated by, and spurred further, changes in the form and operation of the party-state - state transformation. We examine its three main vectors - fragmentation, decentralistion and internationalisation. 9/

Consequently, while foreign policymaking was concentrated under Mao in few hands, now many actors operate internationally, with often different interests and agendas - subnational governments, SOEs, regulators, central ministries and more. 10/

We then explain how policymaking is made and implemented in this context. We avoid dichotomies - either the centre controls everything or it's a free-for-all. Instead we outline *how* power is exercised: via the Chinese-style regulatory state. 11/

Leaders rarely use command-and-control systems. They deploy five coordinating mechanisms: party doctrine, broad policy statements, coordinating institutions (LSGs, commissions), fiscal and policy concessions, and the party's powers of appointment, appraisal and discipline. 12/

Subordinate agencies respond with three strategies: they can try to: influence emerging policy frameworks 'from below'; interpret vague statements and policy documents in ways that serve their interests; or, rarely, ignore central agendas completely. 13/

This produces a dynamic policymaking & implementation process, shaped by complementary or competitive interctions b/w diff actors, never resolved decisively into a binding decision or singular policy. Behaviour can be coherent, chaotic outcomes, or everything in between. 14/

We then apply this to three in-depth case studies of China's international engagements in Southeast Asia: #SouthChinaSea, non-traditional security cooperation in the Mekong Subregion, and development financing. These cover the spectrum from 'hard' security to 'low' politics. 15/

In Ch 2, we examine China's 'consistently inconsistent' behaviour in the #SouthChinaSea - one of the world's most serious hotspots. We examines the many actors active in this policy domain and the regulatory policy framework and coordination mechanisms used to steer them. 16/

We show how actors' attempts to influence, interpret and ignore China’s vague SCS policy guidelines explain important incidents and largely account for the crescendo of regional confrontations over the last decade. We consider Xi's partial success in overcoming fragmentation. 17/

In Ch 3 and 4 we examine how Chinese activities intersect with forces within Southeast Asian societies. We apply the same state theoretical approach to identify the key social forces and their relations to the political economy; and how their relationship to the state. 18/

In Ch 3, we examine China's efforts to manage the drugs problem in the 'golden triangle' to prevent imports into China, focusing on opium substitution programs in #Myanmar and #Laos. 19/

The key actors involved in governing this security problem on both sides have skewed counter-narcotics governance towards profiteering, generating considerable social unrest while failing to resolve the underlying security challenge. 20/

We also examine Chinese efforts to manage banditry on the #Mekong, after 13 sailors were killed in 2011. Security agencies have extended their 'governance frontier' into the GMS, leading patrols to make the river safe for Chinese capitalism and established a regional org. 21/

In Ch 4 we examine Chinese development financing. China is now the world's biggest provider, esp since announcement of the #BeltandRoadInitiative. Whereas many view it as economic statecraft, here too state transformation has profoundly shaped policymaking and implementation. 22/

Thanks to state fragmentation, authority and policymaking are contested among central agencies, producing weak oversight for implementing SOEs, which primarily seek pecuniary benefits with scant regard for official Chinese diplomatic goals. 23/

We show how the impact of China's DF is shaped by the interaction of these dynamics with host-state structures and struggles, which we demonstrate via case studies of #hydropower dam development in #Cambodia and #Myanmar. 24/

We show that projects emerge ‘bottom-up’ from lobbying by SOEs and recipient governments, while China’s fragmented DF governance regime permits widespread malpractice. However, final outcomes vary starkly across the two cases given the very different recipient societies. 25/

In Cambodia, Chinese DF was managed by a dominant-party regime bolstering its domination, generating warmer ties with Beijing. In Myanmar, fragmentation meant that similar projects exacerbated social conflict, renewing civil war, & prompting a crisis in bilateral relations. 26/

In the conclusion, we think through the conditions that make Chinese behaviour likely to be more or less coherent. As this book is an exploratory study we did not try to answer this question in advance, and findings debunked obvious hypotheses - e.g high/low politics. 27/

We identify four scenarios, based on the intesection of the two axes as in the figure attached. 28/

In quadrant A, powerful interests’ preferences diverge, but the centre’s coordinating mechanisms are applied and are generally effective, though not without a struggle. This results in considerable fragmentation
and incoherence in practice. The SCS exemplifies this scenario. 29/

In B, powerful interests align and coordinating mechanisms are applied and are effective, resulting in very smooth and consistent policymaking and implementation, giving the impression of a monolithic, unitary state. China’s anti-banditry on the Mekong approximates this. 30/

In C, the interests of important policymaking and implementing agents don't align and coord mechanisms are unused or ineffective, leading to highly incoherent intl behaviours. Counter-narcotics policy in Myanmar and Laos, and DF programmes exemplify this common scenario. 31/

In quadrant D, coordinating mechanisms are not used or are ineffective, but since powerful agents’ interests and agendas align the result is low contestation and relatively consistent international behaviour. Our case studies provide no example for this scenario. 31/

More research is needed to explain the effectiveness of central coordination, and the circumstances that allow issues to shift b/w quadrants. This schema does provide a starting point for generating hypotheses but also for understanding & responding to Chinese behaviour. 32/

We argue that the fact that China does not behave necessarily as a coherent strategic actor doesn't mean it is a harmless intl actor. On the contrary, the fractured party-state often engages in highly problematic behaviour, but often driven by ostensibly subordinate actors 33/.

Another key finding of our study is that targets/recipients play a critical role in shaping the outcomes of China’s intl engagements. The only way to understand what happened is to study how the transformed party-state interacts with disparate social forces in other countries.34/

Finally, I'd like to thank all of the many people without whom this book would never have happened. We tried to list them all in the acknowledgements, but I do apologise for any omissions. My deepest gratitude is to all of you! 35/35

P.S. The book does not discuss hummus or contain daft puns, so if you follow me for those reasons I recommend you give this one a miss.