@Ian_M_Easton: "Over the past two decades, the CCP has established representative offices in Taiwan’s major ports, invested in Taiwanese port building projects, and gained direct access to at least some of Taiwan’s basic port infrastructure."
Me:
"Other Taiwanese ports, including the Port of Taipei, use a significant number of cranes from ZPMC, which is a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Corp. (CCCC). In August 2020, CCCC was blacklisted by the U.S. Department of Defense for its ties to the PLA."
Imagine if, during the Cold War, NATO governments had allowed Soviet state-owned companies to invest in, take part in the operations of, and supply critical equipment to vital transportation facilities—especially facilities that could be used as a CONDUIT FOR INVASION. 🤔
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Again, folks talking up the "shell game" idea where most silos stay empty, talking it up as a "technique is as old as the nuclear arms race" rather than—AFAIK—something that has NEVER ACTUALLY BEEN DONE.
Not sure why we wouldn't assume they're building them to...put missiles in.
A reminder, DoD projected in the last China Military Power Report that China's warhead stockpile would "at least double in size" and move "to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture with an expanded silo-based force."
Just sitting there, anchored off the coast of Guandong Province southwest of Hong Kong, are two large roll-on/roll-off passenger ferries, more than a thousand miles from their normal routes crossing the Yellow Sea.
The two ferries, which you can check out realtime for yourself via these links, are the BO HAI MA ZHU, built in 2015 at over 33000 gross tons, owned by Bo Hai ferries and homeported at Yantai on the Yellow Sea… marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
It appears the PLA has been testing modified ramps that could allow its large fleet of "civilian" car ferries to launch amphibious assault craft from offshore, reducing the need for captured ports.
This matters at a strategic level, as many have taken comfort that the PLA lacks sufficient amphibious assault shipping to invade Taiwan, & doesn't appear to be building at the scale necessary to do so soon.
See for example this passage from the 2020 DoD China Military Report:
China does, however, have the world's largest merchant marine, including dozens of modern Ro-Ro vessels, many of which have been built to military specification since a 2015 law required doing so. maritime-executive.com/editorials/chi…
A little trip down memory lane:
One doesn't have to follow very closely the state of the U.S. Navy to know that it—and the generations-old U.S. naval primacy that has largely underwritten the modern world as we know it—is facing immense challenges now and in the future.
Over recent years China's PLA Navy has overtaken the USN in sheer numbers... cnn.com/2021/03/05/chi…
...and over a long enough timeline is on pace to do so in sheer tonnage as well, having launched more than 50% more tonnage of warships than the U.S. over the 5 year period 2015-2019: cnas.org/publications/c…
Well, might as well chime in on today's discussion of this article about the potential abandonment of Taiwan to the PRC.
I'll stick mostly to where I disagree with specific military assessments which underpin some of the article's policy recommendations. foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/…
Let's start with some assumptions in assessing the military balance.
Since the core of the article is giving up on the idea of defending Taiwan, IMO assessments of the PRC threat to other allies should be based on the military situation post-incorporation of Taiwan by the PRC.
This matters a great deal: Dr. Glaser assesses that the defense of Japan should be straightforward. But while this is true *now* it would become much less so in the case of PRC control of Taiwan.