The commander of @euforbih has chosen the moment of the worst security crisis in BiH since the war to observe that the formation of the BiH Armed Forces was not agreed to at Dayton. No, it was an act of the BiH Parliament, the country’s paramount law-making body.
Why did @euforbih commander chose to make this statement at this time? Let’s just say someone might want to look into his political affiliations in his native Austria, and how those synch up with the regime in Banja Luka.
Here’s the spin by Dodik’s criminally corrupt advisor, the great “gotcha”. Like every other state on Earth, BiH has a parliament that passes laws which are not explicitly stated in the constitution. Don’t like the law? Overturn it in parliament or go to the courts.
As I have pointed out before “we don’t like this law so we are going to pull out of it” is not actually a thing. You either overturn a law, comply with it, or violate it. What Dodik et al are doing is a clear assault on BiH’s rule of law and constitutional order.
If @euforbih HQ is not prepared to serve its mandate - protecting BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order - it should at least have the decency to refrain from comment, rather than providing yokels like Tegeltija with make-believe talking points.
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Strong sense of dread gripping everyone in BiH I am speaking with tonight. Even some informed foreign officials on the ground appear to be struggling to communicate the seriousness of the situation to their respective capitals.
My concern is that dread will soon give way to rage. Dodik is doing everything possible to make himself appear like Karadzic 2.0. But unlike in 1991/92, there won’t be peace marches; there will be demands for confrontation. Which, to some extent, he’s counting on.
As I’ve explained, his entire strategy rests on concocting a crisis which Belgrade & Moscow can then use to orchestrate some kind of (hybrid) intervention. If Dodik can win Transnistria-like status out of that for the RS entity, he’ll be satisfied.
An important txt from @julianborger on the worsening secession crisis in BiH. It’s at least encouraging that the OHR’s report to the UNSC will clearly identify that the risks of conflict have risen sharply, thx to Dodik’s adventurism. Consequences needed. theguardian.com/world/2021/nov…
BiH’s investigative outlet @IstragaB has published the full @OHR_BiH report to the UNSC and the despite lackluster start to Schmidt’s tenure this txt, correctly, pulls no punches, calling the current situation the worst crisis in post-war BiH. istraga.ba/wp-content/upl…
Remains unclear what exact timeline for actual UNSC meeting on BiH will be, whether Schmidt will speak at session. I’ve been told by at least 3 diplomatic sources from 3 different NATO states that while the Russians are the main obstacle, France also being “difficult”.
Appears all pro-BiH parties (!) will present joint elxn reform proposal to international community. Assuming they remain in lockstep, you’d need as few as 6 additional votes to reform constitution. A major development. klix.ba/clanak/2110271…
As noted earlier, this proposal borrows a few solutions from the so-called 2006 April Package, above all the indirect elxn of the presidency. While less than ideal, IMO, a joint platform is critical for ensuring worst sectarian impulses of HDZ/SNSD & their enablers stymied.
This now logically shifts the balance of power. If grand pro-BiH coalition remains united, U.S. and EU would by definition have to pressure HDZ and RS opposition if they are committed to actual reform. That’s a major strategic shift.
Leaked documents obtained by @SlobodnaBosna appear to show US elxn reform plan for BiH. As expected, the entirety of the initiative is premised on strong-arming and dividing pro-BiH parties. DF’s principled stance on no segregation-lite measures identified as key problem for US.
This is, in short, almost exactly the opposite of what BiH needs from Biden admin. Given the waning EU influence in the region, now is the moment to go for bold, genuine liberal-democratic reform; not damp, “deal for deal’s sake” proposals that only embolden centrifugal actors.
In any case, followers of this issue will know that I told you weeks ago that this was exactly the trajectory we were headed down: pressure on pro-BiH actors, accommodating Covic and the HDZ, no meaningful consequences for Dodik. Truly absurd.
Smart take from @DanielSerwer re: BiH: "The West should not wait until Dodik gets the legislative approval he seeks or acts on his own. Prevention will be far better than cure when it comes to secession. Prevention requires a military move." peacefare.net/2021/10/25/bos…
When it's @DanielSerwer writing like this - whoa!: "RS withdrawal from [BiH's] institutions would leave the country in constitutional and legal limbo...only real options at that point would be reversion to the constitution of the Republic of BiH". peacefare.net/2021/10/25/bos…
Dan's reasoning here is part of why the RS oppo so nervous about Dodik's activities. Any unilateral withdrawal from the DPA would, legally, most jeopardize the RS, not BiH, which only exists as a legal category w/in BiH while the latter has full international character...
Regional media report large crowds already arriving in Cetinje ahead of the contested enthronement of the new Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro. Minor scuffles observed. Fears of much more significant clashes heading into tomorrow. klix.ba/clanak/2109040…
Montenegrin media also specifically claim large numbers of buses arriving from Belgrade ahead of the enthronement. Concerns are that the Serbian govt is dispatching its proxy thugs and radicals to stir up violence in Montenegro — a NATO member state. gradski.me/foto-autobusi-…
Footage of much more serious clashes now being circulating in and around Cetinje. Separately, a group of pro-Montenegrin protesters has blocked one of the main roads leading into the city. As expected, tensions rising.