Something to think about as India starts to reduce its dependence on coal.
The first map is districts affected by the 54-year-old Naxalite insurgency.
The second map shows India's coalfields.
The Godavari valley in the east of the country is central to both the insurgency and the coal industry.
We don't know that much about the Naxalites' funding model, but extortion of wealthy local businesses such as mining and coal processing and transport seems to be important.
The insurgency has declined dramatically in recent years but it seems to be in the coal belt that it's hanging on longest.
If the coal industry declines, does that weaken the insurgency (less money, less land expropriation) or strengthen it (fewer jobs, more discontent)?
Read this thread from @rohitreads to get a sense of the major political economy questions that India will face as it reduces dependence on coal:
We know how much carbon there is in fossil fuels and how much CO2 they produce when burned. These are global commodities whose production volumes are well-known.
Multiply the two and you have a good-enough number for FF emissions. The best analysis merely refines this sum.
Whereas calculating land-use emissions involve multiple calculations about the carbon cycles of different ecosystems, and how those ecosystems link up, and are being changed by climate change itself, etc. etc. There's an awful lot that we don't know in all of this!
Now we have 190 countries turning 2019's contentious argument into 2021's reality, committing to end investment in new coal power and phase it out in major economies during the 2030s:
Nigeria is of course Africa's biggest oil producer with the world's biggest conventional reserves after the Middle East, Russia and the U.S., roughly equal with Venezuela.
And it is at the bottom of the escalator of energy-intensive development and industrialization that India is now climbing and China is stepping off.
Very much agree with this @matt_levine piece about the simpler explanation for the lack of oil drilling in the U.S.: it's not ESG, it's just usual expectations around cashflows.
The past ~15 years in oil markets make show this pretty well:
@bopinion When I first started following energy markets 15 years ago, the big thing everyone was talking about was the revenge of state oil companies and the decline of the old "Seven Sisters" -- Exxon, Shell, Chevron, BP, Total, Eni, etc:
The thinking here was pretty straightforward. The offshore and onshore oil basins outside of OPEC that oil importers and international oil companies had used to diversify supply since the 1970s oil crisis (the North Sea, for instance) were more or less tapped out.
At current rate (1st doses up 1.4%/week in NSW, 2.5%/week in Vic) it's conceivable that Victoria's coverage even moves ahead of NSW next month.
A month ago they were 10 percentage points behind.
I very rarely say "x shouldn't be politicized". Most things should be politicized, and there's been lots of genuine failings worthy of criticism around Australia's handling of Covid. But this is why I most hate all this interstate rivalry nonsense.
The sheer volume of bad-faith sniping that has gone on has been mind-boggling, and profoundly dispiriting. Every time I saw some shift in the infection or vaccine data attributed to Dictator Dan or Corrupt Gladys my heart sank.
This is just devastating stupidity, even for this band of absolute chiefs.
Imagine making a highly-levered bet against the Hong Kong dollar peg, at a time when the aggregate balance which underpins it is absolutely surging. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Look at the chart here. When this line goes up, it gets easier and easier for the HKMA to fund the currency peg.
May is when they're shopping this trade around and none of the investors appears to have thought to look at the HKMA's website.