1/ Although I have views on much of Gensler’s speech today (sec.gov/news/speech/ge…), one aspect of it is highly problematic. A 🧵
2/ He says: “if you’re asking a lawyer … if something is over the line, maybe it’s time to step back from the line. Remember that going right up to the edge of a rule or searching for some ambiguity in the text or a footnote may not be consistent with the law or its purpose.”
3/ I’m tempted to mock that statement but being serious for a moment, it’s a real problem. Economic realities are important but so are legal realities. The legal reality is that each Howey and Reves analysis requires questioning whether something is over the line.
4/ Howey requires a review of 80 years of case law with little development on certain prongs or their applications in certain circumstances. For example, the efforts of others prong has not been tested very much in certain ways and official SEC guidance doesn’t help much.
5/ Case law is scant on whether (a) the expectation of profit exists and independently the efforts of others exists or (b) the expectation of profit needs to be from the efforts of others. This isn’t pushing boundaries. It is getting to the right answer.
6/ To be more precise: if person A expects profits from holding bitcoin and efforts of others (person B) will cause bitcoin to increase the value, should the last prong of a Howey be met? I think not but case law is not 100% clear. So do we just step back from the line? NO
7/ Now, if person A expects profits from holding token X and the profits are expected because of efforts of others (person B), should the last prong of Howey be met? I think yes.
8/ This example is only one within the Howey test. I could point to quite a few others on every prong of Howey. Now let’s move on to Reves.
9/ Reves isn’t as old as Howey but there is still 30 years of case law to review. Reves also is a balancing test, requiring you to weigh 4 elements to determine whether the test is met. Sometimes one element existing may be enough to not have a security note; other times it’s not
10/ Example: the fourth element of Reves asks whether a separate regulatory regime, insurance or collateral exists. Courts put more weight on alternative regulatory regimes and collateral than on insurance because they prevent harm in the first place.
11/ Courts don’t recognize all regulatory regimes as equal. Banking regs are sufficient but money transmitter laws are not. Well, what about the CEA, is that enough? We don’t know. So should we just step back from the line? NO
12/ Or for collateral, a depreciating asset like car liens as collateral has weighed heavily in favor of not having a security note, so what about collateral being an asset like bitcoin. We don’t know. So, do we just step back from the line? NO
13/ One interesting question is how do we usually resolve situations where we are close to the line. We seek no-action relief from the SEC. It is well known that the SEC isn’t willing to explore it. This means we are left walking the line.
14/ So, anyway, the point of this thread is to say that we absolutely should not step back from the line. We should figure out where the lines are by requiring courts to tell us, especially when regulators will not. It’s why there are three branches of the government after all 😀
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g. Issue a token with some use case on an already developed network and no actual or implied economic interest and the issuer neither takes any steps nor supports listing the token on an exchange.
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h. Issue a token distributed based only on price and/or quantity needed to use the protocol and not distributing tokens in excess of those needed for that use.
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i. Issue a token used only in a protocol that increases and decreases in value based on the change in prices of goods available in that network.
Below I lay out areas where the Howey test is unclear and requires stepping close to the line. A 🧵
2/ Ambiguity #1: Does the issuer need to receive a benefit from the issuance for an investment of money or does the token recipient need to give up something of value? Courts have addressed it only tangentially and SEC commingles "investment of money" with a “sale.”
3/ Ambiguity #2: The SEC doesn’t believe common enterprise is a factor to consider. Courts disagree as they always look at whether there is a common enterprise. What a mess! Worth noting that courts use three different common enterprise tests, so each needs to be analyzed.
1. The White House's stablecoin report from the President's Working Group on Financial Markets was released today and touches on many important issues related to stablecoins with some discussion of DeFi. 👇
2. Some meaningful language: "[m]uch of the trading, lending, and borrowing activity currently fueled by stablecoins on digital asset trading platforms and within DeFi similarly may constitute securities and/or derivatives transactions...."
3. Based on what we know about the SEC's investigations into DeFi and Gensler's certain influence on this report, this language isn't surprising. It does not reveal much other than a lot of thought needs to be put into the design of DeFi protocols.
1/ FATF published its recommendations. It's so bad that it makes the infrastructure bill look reasonable.
TLDR: Only permissioned DeFi is allowed. An intermediary must be inserted to serve as a VASP. The global impact of these recommendations is an attempted kill shot at DeFi.
2/ Several takes today reflect less concern because they are not focused on DeFi in particular. When looking at DeFi, it is clear that the implications are brutal. They start out ok and then it gets worse from there. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/doc…
3/ Paragraphs 58-61 provide definitions particularly relevant for DeFi. These terms were had been used in prior guidance but were not defined, so they could be interpreted broadly. Other than the use of "active facilitation" in the definition of "conducts," they aren't horrible.
Although the Wyoming DAO bill that @AWright01 helped draft is imperfect, I disagree with the framing by @lex_node, @prestonjbyrne and @stephendpalley. I feel this way mainly because it solves a huge issue: unlimited liability of DAO members. Thread on the good and the bad 👇
1. Good: DAOs currently operate without regard to the possibility of being general partners in a general partnership for US law purposes, making each of them liable for the actions of each other one. This is a particular risk with a DAO consisting of only a few members.
2. Alternatively, there is no general partnership, but each individual is still liable for his or her own actions. The Wyoming DAO bill would eliminate this risk by wrapping a shell of limited liability around the DAO members.
1. The SEC released a set of proposed rules for loosening up current exemptions to registration requirements of securities offering. Details are below 👇 and they include increases to Reg A and CF offering limits. Here are the proposed rules: sec.gov/rules/proposed…
2. The approach to integration (when 2 different securities offerings are treated as one) would change and 4 safe harbors would be created in a new Rule 152. Integration is a more important concept than appears at first blush because it can really restrict offering flexibility.
2a. An offering launched more than 30 days after another is announced or completed would not be integrated with the announced or completed offering, essentially, as long as the rules regarding general solicitation were followed in the prior offering.