26/
g. Issue a token with some use case on an already developed network and no actual or implied economic interest and the issuer neither takes any steps nor supports listing the token on an exchange.
27/
h. Issue a token distributed based only on price and/or quantity needed to use the protocol and not distributing tokens in excess of those needed for that use.
28/
i. Issue a token used only in a protocol that increases and decreases in value based on the change in prices of goods available in that network.
29/
j. Issue a token that accrues no inherent economic value and stating that the issuer will have no further involvement with the network and the issuer actually has no further involvement.
30/ k. Issue a token that accrues fees from a protocol that is developed and stating that the issuer will have no further involvement with the network and the issuer actually has no further involvement.
31/ l. Issue a token that accrues fees from a protocol that is developed, the issuer making no statement about it and the issuer goes to the Bahamas with no internet connection (see telegram Bahamas test).
32/
m. Issue a token that accrues fees from a protocol that is developed and the issuer remains involved but only in a nominal way compared to all others using and building around the network (from a technical, marketing and BD perspective).
33/
n. Issue a token that accrues fees and gives control over all aspects of a protocol to token holders with all token holders able to make their own decisions regarding the protocol and be involved with changes to it at any time.
34/ o. Issue a token that accrues fees and gives decision-making power re the protocol to token holders through a central party who is in control of making changes only pursuant to the direction of token holders.
35/ I can point to projects that embody actual examples of the facts outlined above and each project knows it is cutting it close to the line because it doesn't know where the line is located. I’m glad they exist and didn’t give up because they were too close to the line.
36/ This lack of clarity on 16 issues is just for Howey as applied to token distributions. Reves is even more unclear. Then, don’t get me started on the lack of clarity when applying these laws to protocols under the Exchange Act, Advisers Act, the Investment Company Act, etc.
37/ Then we can get into the lack of clarity under Reg S and the SEC’s jurisdiction. Overall, securities laws are ripe with situations that require taking actions that are close to a line and all companies should be free to do so.
38/ Maybe I'll write some more threads on these other examples of ambiguity in the law.
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Below I lay out areas where the Howey test is unclear and requires stepping close to the line. A 🧵
2/ Ambiguity #1: Does the issuer need to receive a benefit from the issuance for an investment of money or does the token recipient need to give up something of value? Courts have addressed it only tangentially and SEC commingles "investment of money" with a “sale.”
3/ Ambiguity #2: The SEC doesn’t believe common enterprise is a factor to consider. Courts disagree as they always look at whether there is a common enterprise. What a mess! Worth noting that courts use three different common enterprise tests, so each needs to be analyzed.
1/ Although I have views on much of Gensler’s speech today (sec.gov/news/speech/ge…), one aspect of it is highly problematic. A 🧵
2/ He says: “if you’re asking a lawyer … if something is over the line, maybe it’s time to step back from the line. Remember that going right up to the edge of a rule or searching for some ambiguity in the text or a footnote may not be consistent with the law or its purpose.”
3/ I’m tempted to mock that statement but being serious for a moment, it’s a real problem. Economic realities are important but so are legal realities. The legal reality is that each Howey and Reves analysis requires questioning whether something is over the line.
1. The White House's stablecoin report from the President's Working Group on Financial Markets was released today and touches on many important issues related to stablecoins with some discussion of DeFi. 👇
2. Some meaningful language: "[m]uch of the trading, lending, and borrowing activity currently fueled by stablecoins on digital asset trading platforms and within DeFi similarly may constitute securities and/or derivatives transactions...."
3. Based on what we know about the SEC's investigations into DeFi and Gensler's certain influence on this report, this language isn't surprising. It does not reveal much other than a lot of thought needs to be put into the design of DeFi protocols.
1/ FATF published its recommendations. It's so bad that it makes the infrastructure bill look reasonable.
TLDR: Only permissioned DeFi is allowed. An intermediary must be inserted to serve as a VASP. The global impact of these recommendations is an attempted kill shot at DeFi.
2/ Several takes today reflect less concern because they are not focused on DeFi in particular. When looking at DeFi, it is clear that the implications are brutal. They start out ok and then it gets worse from there. fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/doc…
3/ Paragraphs 58-61 provide definitions particularly relevant for DeFi. These terms were had been used in prior guidance but were not defined, so they could be interpreted broadly. Other than the use of "active facilitation" in the definition of "conducts," they aren't horrible.
Although the Wyoming DAO bill that @AWright01 helped draft is imperfect, I disagree with the framing by @lex_node, @prestonjbyrne and @stephendpalley. I feel this way mainly because it solves a huge issue: unlimited liability of DAO members. Thread on the good and the bad 👇
1. Good: DAOs currently operate without regard to the possibility of being general partners in a general partnership for US law purposes, making each of them liable for the actions of each other one. This is a particular risk with a DAO consisting of only a few members.
2. Alternatively, there is no general partnership, but each individual is still liable for his or her own actions. The Wyoming DAO bill would eliminate this risk by wrapping a shell of limited liability around the DAO members.
1. The SEC released a set of proposed rules for loosening up current exemptions to registration requirements of securities offering. Details are below 👇 and they include increases to Reg A and CF offering limits. Here are the proposed rules: sec.gov/rules/proposed…
2. The approach to integration (when 2 different securities offerings are treated as one) would change and 4 safe harbors would be created in a new Rule 152. Integration is a more important concept than appears at first blush because it can really restrict offering flexibility.
2a. An offering launched more than 30 days after another is announced or completed would not be integrated with the announced or completed offering, essentially, as long as the rules regarding general solicitation were followed in the prior offering.