High European gas prices has many reasons but one factor seems to be Gazprom's low storage fill in Europe. Is that really true? Let us look at the facts of @Gazprom's storage situation in Europe. 1/...
Friendly reminder: The EU imports 33% of its natural gas consumption from Russia, i.e. Gazprom! So if gas is short in Europe, Gazprom does matter. 2/...
So can we measure the storage percentage fill of Gazprom? Yes, once we identified its locations. Specifically, they are Rehden, Etzel, Jemgum, Katharina in Germany, Haidach in Austria, Bergermeer in NL, Damborice in Czech & Banatski Dvor in Serbia. 3/..
Source: Gazprom
The result: Gazprom storage in Western Europe is 24.6% filled as of 5/11/2021. As they say: thanks for nothing!
Note: we do not have data for Serbia & Czech. But it is irrelavant. The big 3 - Rehden, Haidach & Bergermeer matter. 4/...
How do the "big 3" screen for seasonality?
Rehden: 9.4%
5/..
Haiden (Austria): 2%
Pro Memoria: Austria is the gas hub of Central & Eastern Europe - 80 million people.
6/...
Bergermeer (Netherlands): 30%
Pro Memoria: The Netherlands are the gas hub of Western Europe (TTF = Title Transfer Facility) = (Henry Hub role in US). Think: what happened when Cushing wasn't able to clear last spring etc.
7/..
Which leads me to Groningen which produes at constrained 8.5bcm in 2021; capable of 20bcm? Size of EU gas market: 470bcm in 2019, ie 4.2%? This SWING producer (like Ghawar) must continue geopolitically. Period. 8/
Counting on more LNG imports? Well, LNG is highly sought after globally. As the global link of local markets, it accelerates gas price convergence. LNG is already 50% of global gas trade & will continue to grow as long as China tries to replace its coal input.
9/...
Having doubts on price convergence? Since January 2020, Asian LNG prices (quotes as JKM or Japan-Korea Cargo Swaps) have basically converged with EU TTF prices. The link? LNG imports. 10/..
Source: Burggraben analysis; Bloomberg
Of course, other factors mattered too. For instance EU regulators. They pushed to abandon Oil-Gas Linked contracts during times of high oil prices (pre-2014) to protect consumers. Result: Gazprom trades 80% GOG - Gas to Gas Price today (i.e. by d/s market forces). 11/...
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On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.
In this episode, we discuss China's 2nd of 5 economic paths it can follow.
This episode will also focus on Xi the leader. To understand Xi means to better understand China's economic path forward.
1/n #China
Can China replace malinvestment with more consumption?
Answer: Maybe a little bit & over a long time frame, but President Xi does not want to focus on this path. Instead, he wants to implement his socialist utopia.
2/n
Yes, China’s rising entrepreneurs were welcomed by the Communist Party for at least two decades. But all of that is in reverse.
Under Xi Jinping, China has moved full circle: from low growth & low freedom in the pre-reform era back towards something similar today.
In this episode, we discuss China's investment-led growth model & the first of 5 economic paths China can follow.
As you would expect, also this episode is full of Chinese characteristics!
1/n #China
Starting in 1990s, China’s economic engine has been fueled by capital investments.
Its central planning bureau defined GDP targets, picked winners and drove growth from debt-driven capital formations (green line).
2/n
Has any other nation tried this before, ever? Not to our knowledge.
We checked at ALL G20 economies and their respective growth models for past 70 years. 45% capital formation share is a unique experiment in economic history.
Over the past 3 years, we made some controversial calls in commodities. We decided to exit our oil holding in Aug 2022, we went short natgas in early 2023 or called for copper to go lower in May.
Why? Because we have an egde on China.
1/n #China
Yes, mainstream media picked up pace on important issues facing China today.
Most came to understand that the property bubble burst, that the economy is slowing, that geopolitical frictions are emerging, that there is too much debt.
But do they understand the underlying forces that drive these issues?
2/n
While the majority of these facts are known, most Western observers, investors & industrialists do not fully appreciate their interdependence & the structural changes that are unfolding in China today.