The Tansiqiya (IRCC), a semi-anonymized joint #Iraq-i paramilitary front, condemned in a statement (Nov. 7) the drone attack on the house of Iraqi PM #Kadhimi.
Which resistance axis faction implicitly backed the statement? Who ignored it?
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Translation (brief): "We condemn the targeting of the outgoing PM's house which we consider an act of targeting the Iraqi state that we have built with our blood and this position [the premiership] is exclusively among the most important state institutions....
...and we consider it the biggest achievement that the [Shiite] majority acquired after the fall of the dictatorship...who perpetrated this attack aimed for a false flag operation...
...especially that we have been strongly calling for conducting a investigation to get justice from who killed our martyrs..." (end)
1. It was not shared by the Tansiqiya's Telegram channel. The last statement the channel shared was on Oct. 18 asking pro-PMF protesters to refrain from violence.
The fact that Nov. 7 statement was not shared on the channel strongly indicate that not all key members concurred.
2. Who likely supported it:
There is some evidence from Telegram that this could have been supported by: Badr Org. (Baa), Harakat al-Nujaba (Nujaba TV/Qaher), and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Ahad TV). The media platforms affiliated with those groups shared the Nov. 7 Tansiqya statement.
3. Who might have not?
Kata'ib Hezbollah is unlikely to have supported it. Why? Usually, Kaf, a KH-affiliated Telegram channel, shares Tansiqiya statements. But it did not this time. The last time it did share a Tansiqiya statement was on Oct. 18.
Sabereen News did not share.
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Multiple projectiles reportedly targeted a Turkish military post in Zlekan, Ninewa. This could be the 4th attack targeting Turkish military posts this year in Iraq. One attack was preempted by Iraqi security forces in Sep. this year. shafaq.com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%8…
On Nov. 4, Ass. Sec. General & the Spox of Harakat al-Nujaba questioned in a tweet if the Iraqi gov. is unaware whether the TR military has been building building a post in Metin, Duhok (the KRI) since the 1st of Nov this year. However, no direct threat was made by Shammari.
Together with AAH, Harakat al-Nujaba is very overtly hostile to Turkish military presence in northern Iraq & the KRI. Unlike other key resistance axis factions, HaN is unlikely to be consumed by the current impass in Baghdad, presumably giving it more leeway to act elsewhere.
How Iraqi resistance axis media brought back Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (KIA) into KH/AAH line?
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KIA's SG, Shibl Zaidi, tweeted on Oct. 20 that "the next gov. is inevitably a national unity one because political blocs need one another & they are forced to accept the other...
...this is a reality produced by a distorted electoral process & political sharing process since 16 yrs. accompanied by deep and accumulated failure. Those who posses vetos & preconditions will only be a delaying factor to national consensus...
...or put themselves out of the equation and flock. Manual vote counting for candidates who legally appealed is a legal right and religiously legitimate. Delaying & rejecting this is unacceptable and things will end at manual counting because there is insistence & grievance...
A few hours prior to the Iraqi resistance axis' backlash against elections' results (e.g. see KH Askari's escalatory statement), Iraq-focused former Iranian diplomat Amir Mousawi congratulated cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on the gains he realized in elections.
Mousawi "hopes" that Sadr allies with the SoL/Fatah (whom he refers to as "the believing powers") to create the biggest bloc. Can Mousawi's conciliatory tone vs resistance brinkmanship indicate some sort of disconnection btw. Iranian policymakers and the resistance at this stage?
Already, friction was apparent between KH-AAH and Hezbollah's Iraq envoy a few days before elections as media figures linked to those two groups were criticizing Kawtharani for his potential support for PM Kadhimi.
Spot on. The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission's wording in its latest statement issued today on US "combat troops" withdrawal was carefully ambiguously worded to provide the groups the leeway to (de-) escalate vs. US without rhetorical commitment to either tactic.
The IRCC commits to "readiness" to escalate against the US and this is different from commiting to "escalation" as an ultimate strategy and end to itself.
But a group like KSS, a key member of the IRCC, make it clear that their decision is "escalation" rather than mere "readiness". Its commander Abu Ala says: "The resistance's operations continue till the occupier is forced to withdraw in a servile way".
Who speaks 1st on behalf of the PMF/Iraqi resistance casualties after US airstrike(s)?
The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Commission was probably the 1st to condemn US airstrikes, promising revenge (5:19 AM Baghdad). Aim: reflect an early semblance of Iraqi paramilitary unity.
The IRCC recently established a Telegram channel (Sabereen News shared it) and created a logo: a 16 vector-Islamic design may have been chosen to signal the multiplicity of actors involved. The channel and logo come many months after the IRCC 1st appeared in Oct. 2020.
The PMF 14th Brigade Commander's comments on the event were circulated around half an hour after that of the IRCC (5:51 AM - Fariq al-Wilaya). Ahmed al-Magsosi expressed readiness to respond and take revenge, waiting for the orders of the "general command."