Thread by @awildknight

Here is my analysis of what the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), #Sudan's paramilitary group, were doing to promote their image on social media just weeks before the military coup on October 25. 🧵👇medium.com/dfrlab/sudanes…

In September Facebook removed a network of 993 assets linked to the #RSF for violating their policy against "foreign or government interference." The assets were used to amplify pro-RSF content and support the group's leader, Hemeti.
about.fb.com/wp-content/upl…

This post from one of the most active pages, نحنا دعامه (“We are the rapid forces”) claimed Hemeti was the only hope for Sudan. The image is copied directly from his verified FB page.

In previous takedowns by @DFRLab, @stanfordio and @Graphika_NYC inauthentic Sudanese pages presented themselves as media. This network included 37 pages that claimed to work in media, repackaging RSF press releases as news or copying content from legitimate news sites.

Four pages, two claiming to be news, posted a word-for-word copy of a RSF press release within twenty minutes of one another.

A number of the pages also had admins in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Sudan's current military leader, al-Burhan, and Hemeti both have close ties to the two Gulf States.

An interesting page with Gulf State admins was إف إف سي نيوز - FFC News. The coalition FFC organised months of civilian-led protests before the military ousted strongman Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, but FFC news was created in May 2019 & posted pro-military content.

Spreading propaganda and disinformation by impersonating media seems to be standard operating procedure for those trying to manipulate Sudanese social media users, many of whom "depend heavily on social media for news." reuters.com/world/africa/f…

It's been two weeks since the #SudanCoup and the internet is still disrupted. #KeepitOn