Brief thoughts on Russian military activity and deployments. The deployment does constitute a buildup, and not just north, or east of Ukraine. Elements of 41st CAA, 1st GTA, & 58th CAA reinforcing permanently based units of the 20th and 8th CAA & 22nd Army Corps in Crimea. 1/
The military activity is out of cycle. These are not routine drills, certification checks, and one would struggle to come up with innocuous explanations for what is being observed. It is not just about 41st CAA units moving up to Yelnya, or 1st GTA movements. 2/
This activity is not particularly public, or paired with coercive statements, compared to what took place in February-April earlier this year. It does appear that the Russian military has been ordered to position itself for a possible operation in the coming months. 3/
I don't see indicators that a Russian military offensive is imminent. Hence this is not a situation likely to unfold in the coming days or weeks. I would look to the winter, maybe after the holidays. Either way, I doubt a political decision has yet been made. 4/
The more ominous aspect of these deployments is a change in political tone. Russian leadership has been laying out a position on Ukraine this year, emphasizing red lines, such that it appears they believe use of force would be lucrative or necessary to achieve political aims. 5/
In retrospect, events back in the spring can be interpreted both as a public coercive warning, and as a dress rehearsal. Regarding Ukraine’s MoD denial last week. I don’t know what to make of it, but it was complete nonsense.
At the end of the day only Russian leadership knows if they intend to use force, on what scale, and when. So nothing is certain, but stepping back and looking over the course of this year, the trendline and indicators are decidedly negative.
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Commercial sat imagery suggests that units parked at Pogonovo began leaving over a week ago. A new concentration has appeared near Yelnya in recent days. The 144th is an unfilled, understrength division. It appears that elements of the 41st have shifted position to Yelnya. 1/
Elements of the 41st CAA were parked in Pogonovo after March-April, supposedly to participate in Zapad-2021 exercises. They never left after the exercise which concluded mid-September. Then began loading and moving out over the past week. janes.com/defence-news/n…
Here The Lookout's post is quite helpful, discussing the appearance of a new concentration of forces in Yelnya that emerged in recent days, and unlikely to belong to the 144th MRD.
Fascinating podcast on tripwire forces & deterrence, but in listening to this, and reading the article I have questions. If just having sufficient forces to blunt was a solution, then we wouldn’t have weaker states attacking stronger ones. How much does the mil balance matter? 1/
The authors seem to stray a bit into the best deterrence is defense. That’s not true, defense is not deterrence. However, the belief that having deployed forces to blunt an attack & thereby achieve deterrence by denial is the prevailing conventional wisdom in DC. 2/
The problem is that military establishments come to different impressions of the military balance, expectations for how a war might go, and political leaders are not impressed by capability/operational concepts anyway. Having more stuff is only part of the equation. 3/
Some thoughts on Shoigu's recent announcement declaring an end to this buildup of Russian forces near Ukraine's borders. Well, most of them. The statement is a positive evolution of this situation, but I would not count the matter resolved. Thread 1/ tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…
Shoigu suggested that the deployed elements of 41st army are actually staying in Pogonovo outside Voronezh until Zapad-2021. This means through September. 56th VDV BDE is not on his list, so we can assume they will stay in Crimea and convert into a regiment there as planned 2/
We still have to see this withdrawal happen over the coming weeks, even as there are indicators that some units are on the move from Eastern Military District in Russia to this region, i.e. the final force posture that they intend to maintain after April is unclear. 3/
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. Russian troop deployments continue. The situation looks set to endure through April into May. Russian rationales (plural) offered remain unconvincing. I would look closely at mil posture and statements over next two weeks. 1/
Russian forces are deploying in staging areas, not moving to forward assembly points, or dispersing. This may change. The distance between Voronezh and Ukraine for example offers some time for indications and warnings, and modest opportunity to detect change in posture. 2/
There are indeed field hospitals, signals units, electronic warfare, air defense, MTO combat service support units involved. Mostly seeing elements of 4 armies, 3-4 VDV units, and supporting assets that belong to higher echelon commands in MDs. 3/
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. I was mostly inclined towards Russia making a demonstrative show of force to intimidate. This week the ongoing buildup in progress & certain aspects lead me to worry more about ultimate intent. Brief thread 1/
Russian forces continue to gather in Crimea and elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders, but fairly slowly. My sense looking at this situation is that nothing is necessarily going to happen right now, but if they have offensive operations in mind, they are more likely mid-late April. 2/
This buildup looks quite different from 2014, but that’s irrelevant. The Russian military is in a different place in terms of capability, force posture, readiness, etc. The political context is different as well. So, we should not fight the last war in analysis. 3/
Nigel raises good points here, but this is fundamentally a Western-centric view of the world which does not obtain, placing tremendous faith into Western coercive credibility over Ukraine. I respectfully differ, and so this is a brief response thread. 1/
Leaders go to war because they feel they must use force to achieve political objectives, not because they perceived a lack of Western political will somewhere. Calling Zelensky with rhetorical expressions of support is hardly an impressive deterrent. 2/
Coercive diplomacy is seeking a change in another state's behavior backed by the threat of force. Russia seeks a change in Ukraine’s position on Minsk, and that of Kyiv’s Western partners. It may work, or it may not work, but one can clearly see why they would attempt it. 3/