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Michael Kofman Profile picture
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31 Oct, 4 tweets, 2 min read
Commercial sat imagery suggests that units parked at Pogonovo began leaving over a week ago. A new concentration has appeared near Yelnya in recent days. The 144th is an unfilled, understrength division. It appears that elements of the 41st have shifted position to Yelnya. 1/
Elements of the 41st CAA were parked in Pogonovo after March-April, supposedly to participate in Zapad-2021 exercises. They never left after the exercise which concluded mid-September. Then began loading and moving out over the past week. janes.com/defence-news/n…
Here The Lookout's post is quite helpful, discussing the appearance of a new concentration of forces in Yelnya that emerged in recent days, and unlikely to belong to the 144th MRD.
Then a while ago we had this, 90th TD on a visit to Yelnya.

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Michael Kofman Profile picture
25 Jul
Fascinating podcast on tripwire forces & deterrence, but in listening to this, and reading the article I have questions. If just having sufficient forces to blunt was a solution, then we wouldn’t have weaker states attacking stronger ones. How much does the mil balance matter? 1/
The authors seem to stray a bit into the best deterrence is defense. That’s not true, defense is not deterrence. However, the belief that having deployed forces to blunt an attack & thereby achieve deterrence by denial is the prevailing conventional wisdom in DC. 2/
The problem is that military establishments come to different impressions of the military balance, expectations for how a war might go, and political leaders are not impressed by capability/operational concepts anyway. Having more stuff is only part of the equation. 3/
Read 8 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
22 Apr
Some thoughts on Shoigu's recent announcement declaring an end to this buildup of Russian forces near Ukraine's borders. Well, most of them. The statement is a positive evolution of this situation, but I would not count the matter resolved. Thread 1/ tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1…
Shoigu suggested that the deployed elements of 41st army are actually staying in Pogonovo outside Voronezh until Zapad-2021. This means through September. 56th VDV BDE is not on his list, so we can assume they will stay in Crimea and convert into a regiment there as planned 2/
We still have to see this withdrawal happen over the coming weeks, even as there are indicators that some units are on the move from Eastern Military District in Russia to this region, i.e. the final force posture that they intend to maintain after April is unclear. 3/
Read 4 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
14 Apr
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. Russian troop deployments continue. The situation looks set to endure through April into May. Russian rationales (plural) offered remain unconvincing. I would look closely at mil posture and statements over next two weeks. 1/
Russian forces are deploying in staging areas, not moving to forward assembly points, or dispersing. This may change. The distance between Voronezh and Ukraine for example offers some time for indications and warnings, and modest opportunity to detect change in posture. 2/
There are indeed field hospitals, signals units, electronic warfare, air defense, MTO combat service support units involved. Mostly seeing elements of 4 armies, 3-4 VDV units, and supporting assets that belong to higher echelon commands in MDs. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
5 Apr
Updated thoughts on the situation around Ukraine. I was mostly inclined towards Russia making a demonstrative show of force to intimidate. This week the ongoing buildup in progress & certain aspects lead me to worry more about ultimate intent. Brief thread 1/
Russian forces continue to gather in Crimea and elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders, but fairly slowly. My sense looking at this situation is that nothing is necessarily going to happen right now, but if they have offensive operations in mind, they are more likely mid-late April. 2/
This buildup looks quite different from 2014, but that’s irrelevant. The Russian military is in a different place in terms of capability, force posture, readiness, etc. The political context is different as well. So, we should not fight the last war in analysis. 3/
Read 5 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
3 Apr
Nigel raises good points here, but this is fundamentally a Western-centric view of the world which does not obtain, placing tremendous faith into Western coercive credibility over Ukraine. I respectfully differ, and so this is a brief response thread. 1/
Leaders go to war because they feel they must use force to achieve political objectives, not because they perceived a lack of Western political will somewhere. Calling Zelensky with rhetorical expressions of support is hardly an impressive deterrent. 2/
Coercive diplomacy is seeking a change in another state's behavior backed by the threat of force. Russia seeks a change in Ukraine’s position on Minsk, and that of Kyiv’s Western partners. It may work, or it may not work, but one can clearly see why they would attempt it. 3/
Read 4 tweets
Michael Kofman Profile picture
1 Apr
More thoughts on Russian military activity around Ukraine. The movements suggest a strong coercive display of force, meant to intimidate, but not a scheduled exercise, or necessarily preparation for an attack. Brief thread. 1/
The deployments appear somewhat unusual, and unscheduled, with forces active or being moved around Ukraine, especially notable were deployments to Crimea. Southern MD announcements of exercises yesterday were post hoc, unconvincing, and not encompassing of the activity. 2/
That said, Russian movements were visible, and intended to be observed. They do not appear to be of the size indicative of an invasion, either from Crimea, or elsewhere. The challenge is that sizable formations permanently based on UKR border offer little notice/warning.
Read 5 tweets

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