The fact that so many people are so impressed by the argument from evil is a sign that it is a very bad argument.
“Taking the argument from evil seriously” means different things.
There is a way in which I do not take it seriously, and a way in which I do.
There is a way in which I do not take it seriously, and a way in which I do.
I do not take the argument from evil seriously insofar as I do not regard it as a strong or deeply serious threat to belief in God, not do I take it seriously as a deep, real, meaningful philosophical question.
I do take the argument from evil seriously insofar as I philosophize about it. My conclusion is that it is from beginning to end a misframed argument.
Hume did a lot of damage when he falsely attributed such an argument to Epicurus, because it is strictly a *modern* argument.
Hume did a lot of damage when he falsely attributed such an argument to Epicurus, because it is strictly a *modern* argument.
As such, the argument from evil, rightly understood, is more an intellectual curiosity that reveals the conceptual inadequacies of a certain time period (ours).
The argument from evil miscarries from the beginning because it conceptualizes God as a moral agent relevantly similar to human beings, which is just wrong, and would not have even occurred to the ancients or medievals, it is so obviously wrongheaded.
St. Thomas raises a different, and properly ontological question, given God’s *nature* as infinite goodness — asking “would not evil necessarily be annihilated?” — an ontological question.
And this would be a serious problem if evil were a substantial existence.
And this would be a serious problem if evil were a substantial existence.
I do not play games in the most serious philosophical matters, such as the “Let us pretend that God is like a human moral agent, and ask questions upon this basis (one we know to be false)!”
I’m quite comfortable in the knowledge that I am in the company of philosophers who do not take the so-called “argument from evil” seriously.
That is, almost all of them, and certainly all the pre-moderns.
That is, almost all of them, and certainly all the pre-moderns.
And if you sprang the “argument from evil” on, say, Plato or Aristotle or Augustine — there answer would be similar to mine: that the “problem” is not a problem and the argument has in-built several fatal false presuppositions.
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