I reviewed The Xinjiang Papers by @adrianzenz, official document leak from China’s party-state. His argument that targeting of Uyghurs intensified under Xi Jinping’s commands is clearly made, logically sound, and supported with strong evidence. A thread 🧵 uyghurtribunal.com
1.
Authentication.
I read original documents and would have refused to review this without them. These can’t be released to protect people’s safety....
2.
...The transcripts are accurate. Most policies and narratives (Sinicisation, Three Evils, Great Revival) are familiar from researching official media, cadre meetings, and “patriotic education”. Many quotes and references to the documents are online.
3.
Significance.
As guides to action for local leaders, the documents demonstrate how policy in xinjiang is designed, disseminated, and implementation monitored and policed by top levels of the party-state…
4.
...Most of the policy content has already been observed but this is the most detailed evidence available of the construction, implementation, and monitoring of specific policies.
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Key policies.
The content matches what we have observed in mosque demolitions, mass internment, coercive birth controls, forced labour, “population optimisation” as euphemism for dispersal, and “Sinicisation of religion”.
6.
However, this is the most significant evidence that these specific practices are designed and policed by the top levels of the party-state.
7.
Chronology.
This was a standout point for me. In 2014, Xi gave fiery speeches and orders to implement new policies to resolve problems in Xinjiang. By 2017, the tone changed with the Central Party Committee reining in local leaders for loose management.
8.
This fits everything we know about the centralised political system of the PRC: the centre commands, provinces implement variably, and the centre reins them in depending on the gravity of the issue.
9.
Meaning.
The documents tell a story and explain what must be done on that basis. For example, document 10 tells a story of rising “religious fever”, waves of “de-Sinicisation”, “Saudi-isation”, and “Arab-isation” that demand stricter policy and implementation.
10.
Islam in China is described as “harmonious” but “global Islam” is framed as a problem of “infiltration” and Sinicisation is needed for national and ideological security.
11.
Finer details.
Some documents contain more specific policy details than publicly available central party documents. Document 10 (“Strengthening and Progressing Islam Work under new conditions”) states…
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….“there exist problems in basic Islam work of not being able, willing, or daring to monitor. The party’s leadership of Islam work is being urgently strengthened.”
13.
Sub-section 7 then explains the “principle is no new construction or establishment of religious venues” and to maintain the principle of “demolish many, build few, and merge mosque construction” (chaiduo, jianshao, hefang jiansi).”
14.
Dr Zenz’ report, the reviews and the full hearings are publicly available. These answer all the questions I have been asked thus far. Also, I am a picky reviewer and love to find flaws and analytical absences, so I would have enjoyed criticising poor work!
What have we learned in 11 years since mass violence between Han, #Uyghurs, and the state in #Xinjiang?
Since the emergence of internment camps sparked wider interest in the subject, many discussions catalogue incidents of violence and describe how the party-state responded. Considerably less attention is paid to why the state responds this way
...particularly why it conceives and punishes some acts of violence and resistance as existential threats but not others. Leaving underlying thinking behind policy and state violence unproblematised rationalises the behaviour and interests of the state as natural and inevitable.