Since the emergence of internment camps sparked wider interest in the subject, many discussions catalogue incidents of violence and describe how the party-state responded. Considerably less attention is paid to why the state responds this way
...particularly why it conceives and punishes some acts of violence and resistance as existential threats but not others. Leaving underlying thinking behind policy and state violence unproblematised rationalises the behaviour and interests of the state as natural and inevitable.
Analysing efficient causes of state policy overlooks enabling conditions that make state response and violence against groups possible. Underlying narratives guiding policymakers’ perceptions and responses to changing circumstances are most important factor but under-analysed.
How were individual acts of violence translated into existential threats to society enabling violence against specific groups? Why was violence by Han against Uyghurs (June 26th and July 7th) described as “ordinary public order incidents” or even “rational defence”?
My @chinaquarterly article argued that Uyghur identity has long been constructed as a threat to China’s power and prosperity by the party-state, while Han identity in Xinjiang is conceived as a source of stability and loyalty.
cambridge.org/core/journals/…
cambridge.org/core/journals/…
This ethnicised narrative of national identity enabled the rapid dismissal of violence by Han against Uyghurs at Shaoguan as “nothing to do with ethnic relations” but Uyghur violence and protests in Urumchi could be labelled together as “scum of the nation”.
This is important context but looking for efficient causes behind arbitrary assertion of state power in extra-legal internment camps, like Hannah Arendt’s description of the unbelievable unreality of concentration camps, has a tendency to assume, “they must have done something”.
Isolating peoples in camps is by default an arbitrary assertion of power. Camps arbitrarily defy rights for some humans to be part of rule-based social order, placing and governing them outside of society and producing perpetual anxiety that anything could happen.
My forthcoming book with @CambridgeUP explores these themes, particularly how the party-state’s ethnocentric model of national identity (Zhonghua Minzu) conceives Uyghurs as obstacles to social progress and national security.
cambridge.org/core/books/sec…
cambridge.org/core/books/sec…
This ethnocentric conceptualisation of a multi-ethnic nation though the identity of the majority has enabled debates in China between historical materialists, who argue that Uyghurs should be guided to natural extinction through “modernisation”...
...and chauvinists, who argue Uyghur identity should be rapidly eliminated for security. The disappearance of the ‘backward’ identities of Uyghurs is a shared goal of these thinkers and this has intensified insecurity in Xinjiang.
Long-term narratives targeting peoples as obstacles to progress and security explain why incidents of violence are rapidly conceived as stemming from group identity and explained as irrational security threats or understandable responses depending on ethnicity of perpetrator.
The authenticity of Uyghur identity has long been dismissed by the party-state in contrast to thousands of years of Han “frontier-building” lineage. Uyghurs primarily identify through Turkic language and Islam but...
...the party-state describes them as “not an Islamic group” and “not a Turkic group”, which only “terrorists” and “separatists” could think. This conceives Uyghur identity per se as terrorism.
Similarly, “ethnic unity” education texts describe opposition to monolingual education, restrictions on religion, and employment discrimination in employment as “terrorist” and “separatist” thought.
The party-state's ethnocentric conceptualisation of identity and its violent approach to ‘unity’ explains how ordinary people can be placed in camps and why people will almost certainly continue to turn to violence.
