A few days after Fyodor Lukyanov's piece on the "Finlandization" of Ukraine, Lavrov proposes a "not one inch to the East" treaty at an OSCE conference in Sweden. Lots of interesting symbolism here. Won't fly very far (I mean his proposal). That's because the times are different.
When Gorbachev missed his opportunity to have Baker's "not one inch to the East" promise codified in a legally-minding agreement (on Feb. 9, 1990), the opportunity was actually there. That was because the USSR was no longer an enemy. Gorbachev could ride far on that goodwill.
But what Lavrov is peddling is much more analogous to Moscow's proposals of the 1950s like Stalin's note on Germany, or Moscow's calls for dismantling military blocs in Europe, or various Soviet universal disarmament initiatives: just propaganda (which they know is propaganda).
The bottom line. If you want people to come along with you, first try to be a nice guy. But since you are not, and everyone knows you are not, and you yourself know that you are not, then, well, what do you expect. Correct: nothing.
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Current commuter read. Great stuff. Hard to disagree with Indyk that Kissinger outplayed the Soviets in the Middle East. Very skillfully done.
Sort of laughed out loud reading here about Obama’s meeting with Mahmoud Abbas. Indyk’s book is a memoir of a kind. He goes back and forth between Kissinger and the later years.
Generally very complimentary, Indyk can be critical of Kissinger's performance. Like here he argues Kissinger did not take Sadat seriously and so failed to avert the Yom Kippur War.
An interesting statement. My SAIS American Foreign Policy class (some of whom are on Twitter): note the language. Remember we talked about this yesterday in the context of "Finlandization" of Ukraine, as proposed by Fyodor Lukyanov and recently also by @LievenAnatol in his piece.
Looks like a big middle finger to Putin from @jensstoltenberg, which will certainly feed Ukraine's hopes of eventually qualifying for NATO membership. Interesting, esp. given that there's no real intention in NATO to allow Ukraine to join.
It's the principle of Russia's veto that @jensstoltenberg objects to here even if this veto may never have to be used. Interestingly, it won't be used because it exists; i.e, NATO will probably be unwilling to find out whether Russia means business by putting the veto to a test.
nationalinterest.org/feature/russia…. Oh my, the Russian and the Chinese ambassadors publish a joint op-ed against the forthcoming Summit for Democracy. Some juicy reading here, people.
So the basic premise is that the US should not hold such a summit because it will create unneeded ideological dividing lines.
BTW, the notion of "de-ideologizing" international politics goes back to Gorbachev. It was the cornerstone of his new thinking. By this he meant the rejection of Marxist-Leninist dogma that previously underpinned Soviet foreign policy. This here is also straight out of Gorbachev:
An interesting set of arguments. Not sure I fully agree. While I would agree that Lukashenko is anything but Putin’s puppet, Russia’s signaling on Belarus has been ambiguous. Instead of working to diffuse the crisis, it has issued statements that only embolden Lukashenko.
A good example of that is Patrushev’s interview to AIF; anyone looking for evidence of full Russian complicity doesn’t need to look any further. (But NB contrary statements by Putin himself in relation to gas, indicative of his frustration with Lukashenko).
On the agency of DNR/LNR, an interesting question. I would not overstate this agency given their complete dependence - political, economic, military - on Russia. In other words, if Russia ever needed to sell out its clients in Donbas, Putin could do it at very low cost.
A thought-provoking article by @scharap, where he argues the US should arm-twist Ukraine to meet Russia's demands on Donbas: politico.com/news/magazine/…. I see it has triggered an interesting debate among experts. My take is as follows: 👇🏿
For a start, we need to agree on what Putin's aims in Ukraine are. That's a 64,000 question but let's just say there are two possibilities. 1) He is intent on annexing Ukraine. Why? Well, say has set his mind on 'gathering the lands', etc, which he would see as his legacy.
If this is the case (and in my view this is extremely unlikely) - but for the argument's sake we'll say it's a possibility - then making concessions to Russia on Donbas will hardly satisfy Putin - it'll just feed his appetite. If he is going for broke, he is going for broke.
This here is not a very intelligent idea. Under international law, one either recognises a country or one does not. When you recognise a country, you recognise its government, whoever happens to run it. Democrats, dictators, kings, anyone.
So, it won't fly in strictly legal terms but will of course annoy the Russians for little gain. I doubt, in fact, that this resolution will ever pass but it's already making rounds in the Russian media. The Kremlin will milk it dry for the purposes of domestic legitimacy.
You'll ask: how can Putin be legitimised by "non-recognition"? This is because "non-recognition" is a form of recognition - Putin is recognised as the "other", the "enemy". One can, in fact, derive domestic legitimacy from being seen as America's adversary.