Thread by @DrRadchenko

A thought-provoking article by @scharap, where he argues the US should arm-twist Ukraine to meet Russia's demands on Donbas: politico.com/news/magazine/…. I see it has triggered an interesting debate among experts. My take is as follows: 👇🏿

For a start, we need to agree on what Putin's aims in Ukraine are. That's a 64,000 question but let's just say there are two possibilities. 1) He is intent on annexing Ukraine. Why? Well, say has set his mind on 'gathering the lands', etc, which he would see as his legacy.

If this is the case (and in my view this is extremely unlikely) - but for the argument's sake we'll say it's a possibility - then making concessions to Russia on Donbas will hardly satisfy Putin - it'll just feed his appetite. If he is going for broke, he is going for broke.

2) The other possibility is that he is pursuing limited aims, and any and every move on Ukraine is underpinned by a careful calculation of costs and benefits. We know Putin is a cautious operator, so this is by far the more likely scenario.

In Putin's calculus, the key consideration is the danger of war. He must estimate that the prospect of the West coming to Ukraine's aid is very low, which makes him act more rashly. This doesn't mean that he wants a war; he just deems it unlikely, so he upping the ante.

Arm-twisting Ukraine to make concessions to Russia in a sense rewards his risk-taking behaviour, insofar as he will see that such arm-twisting has taken place right after (indeed, in reaction to) his sabre-rattling. Sabre-rattling must've worked, he'll conclude.

What if he is not bluffing, you'll say. Well, if this is the case, we must conclude that Putin is pursuing option No. 1, and this would go very much against everything we know about how Putin acts. And, once again, if it's No. 1, then no concessions are likely to stop him.

In short, it's an interesting situation. In this psychological game, discussion of possible concessions may indicate an intent to concede, and so may actually embolden, rather than constrain, the other side.

We often hear that Ukraine is more important to Putin than it is to the West, which is taken to mean that he'll fight for it if push comes to shove.

Of that, I am not so sure. Might he not be more likely to think, like his role-model Yuri Andropov in the 1980-81 Polish crisis, that the quota of foreign interventions had already been exhausted?

BTW, I would not be a Cold War historian if I did not add here that Andropov's dim view of the prospects of intervening in Poland of course stemmed from a calculation of costs and benefits, and his fear of a sharp reaction in Washington to such an invasion.