Good question.
I don't make such an assumption; and my reasoning doesn't implicitly depend on such an assumption.
I'll elaborate.
I don't make such an assumption; and my reasoning doesn't implicitly depend on such an assumption.
I'll elaborate.
https://twitter.com/lukestamps/status/1466415180045246479
There are a number of moving parts here, so it's important to be clear about the relevant contrast class. I think 'willful taking of human life' is suitable.
But 'espousing an economic policy' obscures what's at stake.
But 'espousing an economic policy' obscures what's at stake.
The salient point is that we know certain policies will result in avoidable human death.
So the relevant contrast class is:
willful taking of human life v. knowingly allowing avoidable human death
So the relevant contrast class is:
willful taking of human life v. knowingly allowing avoidable human death
It's actually really controversial whether the willful taking of human life is all that different, morally speaking, from knowingly allowing avoidable human death.
(See, e.g., Onora O'Neill's 'Lifeboat Earth'
peeps.unet.brandeis.edu/~teuber/Onora-… )
(See, e.g., Onora O'Neill's 'Lifeboat Earth'
peeps.unet.brandeis.edu/~teuber/Onora-… )
In any case, my reasoning sidesteps that debate:
I characterize the pro-life position in the way that its proponents typically do. I then underscore the difference between that pro-life ideal and mere opposition to abortion.
I characterize the pro-life position in the way that its proponents typically do. I then underscore the difference between that pro-life ideal and mere opposition to abortion.
I leave it to the reader to decide whether the disparity between the pro-life ideal and mere opposition to abortion is significant.
So note well: the distinction between the pro-life position (i.e., anti-[killing or letting die]) and the merely anti-abortion position (i.e., anti-[killing]) is morally significant *only if* there's a morally significant difference between killing and letting die.
In other words, my reasoning culminates in a conclusion that's significant *only if* we assume that there's a difference between killing and letting die--i.e., the opposite of the assumption you suggest.
Thus, as I note, there are differences between the case of Baby Roe and Baby Smith. But those differences are only morally salient if you're merely anti-abortion. If you're pro-life, the differences aren't salient, so you should reject healthcare libertarianism.
At no point do I suggest that there isn't a difference. On the contrary, I go out of my way to highlight the differences so that I can show why they shouldn't matter to someone who's genuinely pro-life.
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