Thread by @Jack_Mrgln

Great overview of Russian activity including Wagner in the Central African Republic and what it means for peace from @PaulineBax1

It’s clear based on these recommendations just how great the challenges are. Some thoughts:

https://twitter.com/CrisisGroup/status/1466742478220967937

It’s difficult to imagine how France, EU, US can interface reliably w the Russian parties for a few reasons. Not the least of which is the fact that Russian PMCs have reportedly made use of EU-trained forces and MINUSCA assets…

https://twitter.com/EnriPicco/status/1466771708032036876

All while very aggressively undermining any engagement by the Eu, France, MINUSCA etc through public statements and disinformation.

Honestly, I think the bigger challenge to any kind of interfacing with Russian elements in Bangui is knowing who’s in charge.

And that’s because there may not be a good answer to that. Wagner coordinates with the Russian state and serves their objectives, but they are also comprised of a diffuse networks of companies and individuals which act to serve their own interests as well.

I appreciate that this report also emphasizes specific reported abuses by Wagner forces in the CAR, namely against Fulani and Gbaya. Deeply concerning, and key to document. I am interested in where this direction is coming from, beyond just indiscriminate force.

As @PaulineBax1 points out, it’s within Touadera’s right hire PMCs. I’ve heard people here make reference to the example of Executive Outcomes - particularly when it comes to swaying a long and seemingly intractable conflict to create space for political settlement.

BUT I would emphasize that Wagner is not a conventional PMC (recognizing that even that is a slippery concept). I say that not only because they directly engage in combat in a way that most larger PMCs shy away from, but also because they undertake non-military responsibilities…

They coordinate with and overlap with the Russian state (again, not entirely unique as PMCs go), they have a dismal track record in regards to human rights, and a shaky record even in regards to success (see: Mozambique).

For example, as “non-military responsibilities” go, Russian elements took over the CAR’s customs services for a time. Their role goes far between just the military domain. It’s not evident that they are terribly competent in these other areas…

And they raise tremendous questions over sovereignty and Russian objectives. Which brings me to the last point of this meandering thread - how these guys get paid.

This @CrisisGroup report points out concerns about payment via mineral wealth.

It’s still not clear how Russian PMCs in the CAR are paid by the CAR government. This report makes some interesting notes that they do not appear in the national budget.

I am skeptical that even preferential mineral resource exploitation can cover these costs in practice.

I say that because of this network’s track record elsewhere - and also bc there is not yet solid evidence of the profitability of Russian mining ventures like Lobaye.