In my 5 years in the US government (2009-2014), NATO expansion to Ukraine was a non-issue in U.S.-Russia relations & U.S.-Ukraine relations. 1/ THREAD
In 2010, Medvedev even attended the NATO summit in Lisbon. He said, "The meeting… was historic in terms of its spirit and atmosphere." (I was there; he was thrilled to be at the meeting.) 2/
While attending Obama, Biden, Clinton, Lavrov, Donilon, etc. meetings with Putin/Medvedev/Lavrov, and listening in on nearly every phone call between Obama and Russians for 5 years, I cannot recall a serious contentious exchange about NATO expansion. 3/
Between 2009-2014, the Ukrainian government also was not pressing for NATO membership. Yushchenko was not pushing. Yanukovich was firmly against. Societal support was weak & focused more on joining the EU. 4/
Putin revived the NATO expansion threat after annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine in 2014. I understand why. If I worked for him, I'd recommend pushing the same propaganda line. But for everyone else, let's be clear about the timeline & sequence of events. 5/
Since the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, support not surprisingly for joining NATO has risen among Ukrainians. But the NATO alliance has remained lukewarm to the idea. A MAP has not even been started. 6/
Putin wants you to believe otherwise. Some of his crazy propaganda channels are even warning of a Ukrainian attack on Russia! But let's restate the obvious; Putin has completely invented these threats, which he of course does not believe. 7/ END THREAD
Bonus thread add -- if you want to read the details of this history, check out FROM COLD WAR TO HOT PEACE. It's all in there. amazon.com/Cold-War-Hot-P…
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The job of an intelligence officer is to make probabilistic assessments about the intentions of foreign actors. The job of a US foreign policymaker or diplomat is to try to shape those intentions in ways that serve US interests. 1/THREAD.
If the IC assesses that the probability of Putin invading Ukraine is 10%, then the job of Biden, Blinken, Sullivan et al is to reduce that percentage to 5% or 1%. 2/
Those spending so much time arguing about probabilities should spend more time discussing creative ways to influence these probabilities, no matter if you think it's 70% or 10% probability of invasion. 3/
After 30 years of either liberal internationalism or all-out war, American strategists have forgotten the tools of "coercive diplomacy" for dealing with great power adversaries. Everyone should go back and read Alex George. Some recommendations: 1/ THREAD.
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (with David K. Hall & William Simmons). Boston: Little Brown, 1971. (Expanded Second Edition, 1994, with William E. Simmon.) 2/
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (with Richard Smoke). New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. 3/
Even at the peak of Reagan's constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa, U.S. officials criticized the regime. (though not nearly enough as I wanted at that time!) THREAD 1/
Reagan's Asst Secy for Africa Chester Crocker said that the US wanted to see "the emergence in South Africa of a society with which the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship, without constraint, embarrassment or political damage." 2/
"The nature of the South African political system prevents us from having such a relationship now. That goal will remain elusive in the absence of purposeful, evolutionary change toward a nonracial system." 3/
Posting a series of articles that up to a Plan B. (Note a grand strategy cannot be summarized in a "tweet" or a phase expressing a desired objective (that's not a strategy)
Biden & team have framed their policy towards China as one of "Competition," (sometimes adding adjectives like "stiff" or "responsible.") That's a good start, but not enough. 2 more Cs need to be added explicitly -- Containment & Cooperation. THREAD 1/
On some issues, the U.S. should seek to compete with China robustly, including first & foremost regarding our different systems of governments. We should want to prove that democracy is a horrible system of government but better than the rest, including PRC autocracy. 2/
And democracy is not only a morally superior system, but also produces better social & economic outcomes. That's why bipartisan infrastructure law & Build Back Better will be the most important policy tools for competing with China initiated in several decades. 3/
Are we entering a new Cold War with China (and Russia)? Yes and no. Can we learn from the Cold War to develop smart strategies to contain & engage China & Russia? Yes & no. Is it complicated? Yes! THREAD 1/.
" The Cold War analogy distorts, more than illuminates, dynamics in US-China relations today." 2/
Advocates for a new Cold War w/ China also underplay the costs & mistakes of the actual Cold War—a tragic era that resulted in millions of deaths, including tens of thousands of Americans, support for autocracies in both the East and West & billions of dollars spent inefficiently