The fallacy of the first move. A thread. 1/
As the Russia war scare rumbles on I remain struck by the number of claims being made about the high quality of Putin's military options, demonstrating how any Ukrainian (or other potential victim) resistance will be crushed and how little NATO can do to help.2/
These claims tend to suffer from the fallacy of the first move, by which confidence in the ability of a military operation to achieve its initial objectives leads to a neglect of all the possible - and often more difficult - consequential moves to follow. 3/
If the aim of an operation is to seize new territory then that territory must be held. If it is relatively friendly (eg Crimea) that may not be difficult. If it is unfriendly holding requires a large and potentially indefinite commitment of occupying troops.4/
The larger the territory, and the size of population, to be held the more burdensome the occupation. The smaller the territory taken the less the political gain, especially if then outweigh by strong international reaction.5/
If the aim is punitive, to hurt rather than take, to raid rather than stay, then any political advantage will depend on coercive effect which cannot be guaranteed. The target may become more defiant rather than compliant. 6/
If everything is banked on the impact of the first move, whether it is to control or coerce, then it will benefit from maximum surprise. Otherwise, likely victim and friends, can consider how to resist and counter-measures. 7/
Many wars have been started and ended badly because of this fallacy. Perhaps Putin is in thrall to it although I don't think these risks are hard to calculate. End/
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