@Vausterlitz1 It was not a "dumb" question.

It is just one that has not been well answered.

On 11 January 1942, the IJA completed a study on whether Hawaii could be successfully invaded and, if it could, what would be needed to retain the islands.
@Vausterlitz1 They concluded:

Yes, we can capture it, but supplying would be very hard due to shipping tonnage shortages.

Namely, food to feed 500,000 Americans plus the Japanese Garrison would have to be carried across 4,000 miles of ocean;
@Vausterlitz1 because these were the breakdowns by food grown on Hawaii for consumption:

fruit (84%)
rice (10%)
dairy products (28%)
fish (30%)
eggs (40%)
meat (41%)
vegetables (46%)

The IJA officer noted that 2.9 million tons of supplies had been sent by the US to Hawaii during 1941; or
@Vausterlitz1 ...about 25 ships monthly.

He estimated that under Japanese occupation, figures would be a bit higher -- 3 million tons annually, or about 30 ships a month to keep the population supplied. Also, another 30 ships would be required each month to transport military equipment.
@Vausterlitz1 The conclusion was that Japan's merchant marine was too badly overstretched with various operations and transport duties to accomplish this.
@Vausterlitz1 The above came from this:

Hawaii Under the Rising Sun
Japan's Plans for Conquest after Pearl Harbor
John J. Stephan, (c) 1984

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More from @TrentTelenko

11 Dec
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg IJNAS single engine planes in service in 1941 were equipped with the Type 1 Ku 3 RDF system. This included the Mitsubishi F1M Type Zero Observation Seaplane, Allied reporting name Pete.

So IJN cruiser spotters could & did use the Yamamoto C3I System within range of the beacons.
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg MacArthur's Central Bureau tracked single engine IJN float planes as a operational pattern warning of a major troop convoy before enciphered message traffic arrived.

I hadn't figured out how they were doing that until the role of M/F radio beacons came along.
@ArmouredCarrier @smooreBofB1940 @AC_NavalHistory @Drachinifel @MilAvHistory @MilHiVisualized @CBI_PTO_History @DrydockDreams @TheBaseLeg Those IJN float planes worked at night hunting for PT-boats as well as submarines by day.

They needed the beacons up to accomplish their missions.

When Central Bureau hear the beacons. They knew a troop convoy was in-bound.
Read 5 tweets
10 Dec
The subject of this thread is the IJNAS C3I system behind the destruction of Force Z.

(I'll be using clips from Angus Konstam's book to illustrate this thread)
ospreypublishing.com/store/military…
1/
The anniversary of the sinking of Force Z is on the minds of many #twitterhistorians

For example, @ArmouredCarrier has three really nice videos on YouTube about the sinking of HMS Repulse
2/
youtube.com/results?search…
Konstam's book is wonderful for most of the journalistic "Who, What, Where, When, How, & Why" on Dec 10, 1941, but it leaves out how the command control, communications & intelligence worked for the IJNAS Rikko Kokutai and why it came into existence in time to destroy Force Z.
3/
Read 26 tweets
8 Dec
"MacArthur's Pearl Harbor" AKA the Dec 8, 1941 destruction of FEAF air power at Clarke Field is the subject of this thread.

(Photo: Destroyed P-35 fighters on Clark Field)
1/
One of the important things to know about General Douglas MacArthur was that almost nothing said or written about him can be trusted without extensive research to validate its truthfulness.

There were a lot of reasons for this. The biggest being that if the Clinton era
2/
political concept of “The Politics of Personal Destruction” had been around in the 1930s through 1950s, Gen. MacArthur’s face would have been its poster boy.

Everything he did was personal & that made everything everyone else did in opposition to him “personal” to them. Thus

3/
Read 23 tweets
7 Dec
The subject of this thread is "The Forgotten and Buried Intelligence Lessons of Pearl Harbor, December 7th, 1941."

It is both a 2019 column of mine on the Chicagoboyz blog & an enduring lesson for today.

chicagoboyz.net/archives/61235…
1/
The successful surprise Kido Butai carrier fleet movement to Pearl Harbor was the result of a sophisticated the denial and deception measures to blind allied signals intelligence as to their movements.
2/
A deceptive movement that worked thanks to the hard work & diligence of both Adm Isoroku Yamamoto's staff planners as well as pre-war Japanese intelligence.

The IJN played the US Pacific Fleet's operational tendencies like a harp.

3/
Read 42 tweets
9 Nov
The issues that @fortisanalysis founder, @man_integrated spoke about recently piece on why the USA may never recover from the current supply chain disruptions have a historical analog in WW2 military supply chains.

That will be this thread's subject
1/
Intercontinental logistics is never easy. Even more so when there is a thinking enemy of the other side shooting holes in them.

Yet for all that, the US never got the single most important piece right the clearing cargo through ports & beaches.

See the WW2 D-Day example.
2/ ImageImage
In the Pacific theaters, it was far worse.

The tyranny of distance, no/poor infrastructure, bureaucracy, and inter-service politics were bigger foes than the Japanese.

3/ ImageImageImageImage
Read 30 tweets
30 Oct
CASEY HANDMER'S BLOG has a hugely important piece on Starship. If a space firm misunderstands this passage:

"A dollar spent on mass optimization no longer buys a dollar saved on launch cost. It buys nothing."

It's doomed

caseyhandmer.wordpress.com/2021/10/28/sta…
His blog's comparison of NASA's SLS based Artemis architecture versus a Lunar program based on Starship makes the point.

This is a phase change difference in access to space akin from the X-Atlantic air travel jump from Charles Lindberg to the wide body jet in 5-years.
2/
For the logistical types, these are your current price points:

$100,000/kg for LEO bulk cargo
$1,000,000/kg(+) for deep space exploration.

Starship will do 100 ton (+) chunks for <$10m per launch.

It will be launching several hundred times a year w/in 5-years.
3/
Read 12 tweets

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