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11 Dec, 4 tweets, 1 min read
Thread: Some interesting nuggets in this interview with Andrey Yelchaninov, Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission. He says state trials of the Armata will be completed in 2022 and the military will receive >40 Armata tanks after 2023.
interfax.ru/interview/8071…
I think he probably meant the Russian military will receive >40 Armata in 2023. He also said new Armata ammunition is going through trials right now. 2/
Yelchaninov said tests of the Su-57's 2nd-stage engine will continue until 2026 with the first Su-57 with the 2nd-stage engine to be delivered in 2027. Of the 76 Su-57 ordered as part of GPV-2027, only 25 are expected to have the 2nd-stage engine. 3/
Yelchaninov said they are continuing to assess the financial and technological risks involved in building a new aircraft carrier, and he said the Admiral Kuznetsov should be transferred to the dry dock at the 35th SRZ in 2022 and all modernization work will be done in 2023. 4/

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Rob Lee Profile picture
12 Dec
Russia stopped short of Tbilisi because they had already achieved their goals, a siege would have been costly, and logistics was becoming a problem, not because of the US' response. Instead, Putin learned that Russia could invade non-NATO neighbors and the US wouldn't intervene.
If anything, the US' response to the 2008 War set the stage for 2014 and the current predicament by showing Russia a US military response would not happen. What you think was a sign of strength was interpreted in Moscow as weakness.
If you try to assess Russian foreign policy primarily through the lens of US domestic politics, you will get it wrong. There is also a 90% chance that any op-ed about Russia that mentions Putin's comment about the collapse of the USSR or Lenin's quote about bayonets will be bad.
Read 4 tweets
Rob Lee Profile picture
9 Dec
Not sure what "major change" means, but there is evidence Russia is continuing to send units and equipment near Ukraine, which I assume will continue. The "red line" from the US is a Russian invasion, but not a Russian enhanced military posture with more reinforcements.
Unless Biden announced major concessions during his conversation (which was never likely), the Russian buildup was always going to continue. Putin said he thinks there is value in keeping up tensions. We should expect to see an enhanced Russian mil force near Ukraine for months.
Russia has deployed much if not most of a Central Military District combined arms army near Ukraine. Until it leaves, Russia will have an enlarged military presence, and it would be costly to move it back and return it to Ukraine if the situation worsens. Easier to leave it.
Read 4 tweets
Rob Lee Profile picture
7 Dec
This talk was never going to solve the current situation. Russia will almost certainly keep an enhanced presence near Ukraine's borders for the foreseeable future (i.e. until the summer or longer) and can invade quickly. Much depends on how substantive these discussions are.
The current tensions was a final warning about Russia's red lines wrt/ Ukraine (the spring buildup was the 1st warning, which wasn't heeded). I'm sure those lines were communicated to Biden. I doubt we'll get another warning if Russia chooses to escalate (to achieve surprise). 2/
So the risk of a Russian invasion will be high for the foreseeable future. Another Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas could be enough to start a Russian invasion, as well as a newly announced arms deal for Ukraine. We shouldn't be surprised if Russia escalates on short notice. 3/
Read 6 tweets
Rob Lee Profile picture
5 Dec
There are more units from the Central Military District near Ukraine now than in the spring. Russia can reinforce this area quickly with western and southern district units, which means Russia will have the forces necessary to start a large-scale invasion on short notice.
I don't see many tents and medical facilities at Yelnya, but you can set those up quickly and transport troops there much faster than heavy equipment, which is being prepositioned. If Moscow decides to invade, they can move the other stuff quickly (and use transport aircraft).
We should keep an eye out for army-level C2 equipment if it arrives in Yelnya since I would assume the 41st CAA's HQ would lead its subordinate units if they do anything.
Read 4 tweets
Rob Lee Profile picture
4 Dec
A quick word about the possible scheme of maneuver in these maps. Militaries typically assess the enemy's possible COAs with the enemy's most likely/probable course of action (EMLCOA) and the enemy's most dangerous course of action (EMDCOA). These look more like the EMDCOA.
When you develop a scheme of maneuver, you try to form a plan that achieves your objectives while minimizing risk. Amphibious and airborne operations are inherently dangerous, so is conducting an offensive from only one direction. Where would Russia choose to assume risk? 2/
Re: an amphibious assault, Russia would need to suppress/destroy Ukraine's anti-ship systems (e.g. Neptun) before launching one with large landing ships. If they conducted a landing with only landing craft, they would need to build up that force so it could defend itself. 3/
Read 12 tweets
Rob Lee Profile picture
4 Dec
"U.S. intelligence has found the Kremlin is planning a multi-front offensive as soon as early next year involving up to 175,000 troops"
"The plans involve extensive movement of 100 battalion tactical groups with an estimated 175,000 personnel"
washingtonpost.com/national-secur… Image
The Ukrainian MoD graphic from late November showed 40 Russian BTGs near Ukraine's borders, but the US IC assesses there are now 50 (maybe they used different distances). 100 BTGs would be 2/3rds of Russia's total BTGs. There are also more units nearby not in the red areas. 2/ ImageImage
This part is a little odd. I thought the previous references to concerns about reservists was the BARS program. The 100k figure seems really high and strange. The BARS program is new, so a force of 100k stood up this quickly would likely not be an effective force. 3/ Image
Read 8 tweets

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