Some odd comments here, but otherwise a worthwhile summation of current onshore suits (which, since August, have been amalgamated at the Guangzhou Intermediate Court) against Evergrande.

The "new info" here is in the breakdown and nature of creditors.

ft.com/content/941c0e…
The story suggests US$13.2bn of suits so far. Some of that will be people owed money. Some is people suing in order to start the process of control of projects. Some are suits just to lay claim because it looks like it will get worse.

There is some surprising stuff.
We continue to have comments about onshore vs offshore. It STILL doesn't work like that.

Offshore bonds issued by Evergrande ($3333.HK) and its subsidiaries guaranteed by EG are different than the bonds issued by the onshore real estate subsidiary of 3333 called Evergrande Real
Estate Group (a.k.a. Hengda). The relationship is that Hengda is the property developer. It has hundreds (or 1000+) subsidiaries dealing on a project-by-project basis. Banks lend to projects secured by the project assets. Contractors work for the project co, possibly backed by
Hengda. The project cos owe local taxes. Hengda owes taxes. Hengda has employees. Hengda itself issues bonds, but the "assets" underlying its bonds are mostly its net equity in all the projects. If the projects themselves go under, then a lot of the "equity value' of Hengda
disappears. Hengda is also liable for WMPs issued by someone else which it guaranteed. And other trust loans. And of course its unsecured bonds and loans.

If all of those are paid off and there is money left over in the Hengda shell after it is empty and all the other stuff is
sold (like the HK and Guanghzou HQ buildings) and secured debt there is paid off, THEN the onshore co can take the cash and pass it to shareholders.

Evergrande 3333 HK is a shareholder. It would get residual cash in the real estate business and apply that to its own capital
structure. There may also be some inter-company loans/indebtedness (between offshore and onshore). That gets messy, but in general, onshore real estate business creditors have nothing to fear from offshore creditors. The GZ local govt is not going to let Hengda send money to 3333
as a dividend before creditors are paid out.

So enough with the onshore vs offshore (and offshore bondholders will "get screwed by Chinese authorities"). The process is pretty clean here (much less clean for some other companies tho).

The other striking point here is that
Evergrande was borrowing money from corporates, likely in the form of issuing commercial paper at a discount (so as to not have "interest-bearing debt") to cash-rich corporates. Some issued at "rates of up to 73%."

That number surprised me.

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More from @bauhiniacapital

14 Dec
And the TOB is done. And SBI only got 56.9mm shares out of the 58.2mm shares desired.

Close enough for horseshoes, hand grenades, and assuming control in their case.

Funny though. There was some serious panic volume going through on TOB Day (when if one had tendered at 2000,
one would not need to sell in the market), and anyone shorting it hard post-tender should have their head examined (they should have shorted into the tender).
The data kinda looks like the account of Nomura Aya (daughter of activist Murakami-san) tendered some shares, but we won't know until Friday, or the next time his company City Index Elevens files.

Why?
Tender quantity was an odd-lot ending in x99 shares. And Nomura Aya held 2+%
Read 7 tweets
7 Dec
It’s an hour past midnight EST.
Read 9 tweets
7 Dec
Just the headline is worth it, but there is soooo much more deliciousness here. ImageImageImageImage
He "went short with all his funds" (buying 50% OTM index puts).

(except, of course, the funds used to purchase $200k of face value of Evergrande bonds)

This is, of course, the same guy who can neither count nor mark to market. Image
And in case you haven't done the accounting...

AFTER global indices fall by 90% and he sells his put options (and earns gajillions)...

THEN he will buy gold, which of course, will not have gone up.

This gold owned by his company, which will issue a gold-backed stablecoin.
Read 5 tweets
6 Dec
For months now, most commentators on Evergrande have been displaying bearishness, clearly not expecting Evergrande would be able to make its coupon payments, and also quite clear since early summer the authorities would not bail out Chairman Hui and the company.
4mos ago the 13.75% 23s were in the mid-30s after dropping 40+ points the month after HKY was on the dais for CCP100.

It has been illiquid and effectively insolvent for months. A waiting game. The only thing Evergrande could do was sell assets and it didn't try hard enough.
And many commentators - in the media and otherwise - saw this clearly and cleanly 15mos ago (and some years before).

There is always a "what if" but the mantra from the PBOC for a year-plus now has been "we will not reflate using real estate" and the policy firehose to reduce
Read 4 tweets
3 Dec
Just a note on this "Guangdong Govt Work Group" which is apparently being dispatched to Evergrande... at Evergrande's request... 👀

Evergrande is, simply put, two companies.

The offshore parent with the USD bonds (or most of them) made a filing at 8pm HKT.
There is a technicality on a repayment of an already overdue but extended bond guarantee (for US$260mm) and $82+mm of coupons due 6 Nov, with 30d grace period now DEFINITELY due Monday.

That OFFSHORE parent has some $20bn or so of debt it has to pay. The assets which underlie that debt are holdings in listed subs, some unlisted cos, some debt extended to affiliates, cash borrowed from affiliates, and 60% of the ONSHORE parent which runs the property developer.
Read 20 tweets
1 Dec
This is "big news" but not really that big.

It confirms the shutdown of the loophole which allowed Chinese business to list overseas without CSRC approval. It does not, for the moment, do anything to VIEs.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
It is important to remember that VIEs like BABA may have "opaque" ownership structure, but that is not necessarily a defining characteristic.

The earliest Chinese companies listed on the NYSE like Sina and China Mobile were themselves VIEs.
Further, VIEs have recently listed in HK and this summer saw the mainland's first listing of a VIE ownership company (after the concept was first 'explicitly' endorsed in 2018 with the advent of China Depositary Receipts).

The 2024 Problem looms large. HKEX is gonna be busy.
Read 5 tweets

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