"I didn't want to give satisfaction to Pakistan's ISI to humiliate the Republic and compel a statement under duress. Or worse than that, to interrogate an Afghan President."
"By staying, I'd have legitimated a violent coup. This was a coup. It was not an agreement, all previous statements by the Taliban regarding their conduct had been violated." By leaving, "the road for genuine political settlement was opened and not simply a takeover legitimated."
On events leading up to collapse:
"It had been repeatedly made clear to me that Taliban didn't want to deal with me. And in your active role [Carter], part of the discussion that I had, said “find a dignified way to get Afghan people involved. My insistence was on a Loya Jirga."
"I could not legitimate the end of the Republic. And there was no legal mechanism for me to transfer power to anybody but VP Amrullah Saleh @AmrullahSaleh2. And it had been again made clear that not only I was not acceptable, but Vice President Saleh wasn't acceptable either."
The news that Qatar will now serve as a "protecting power" for US interests in Afghanistan is a good development. While the designation is a common practice in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, how might things shape up moving forward? (1)
The US has neither broken off diplomatic ties with Taliban authority nor had ever formally/informally established one. But considering US refusal to formally recognize the ruling authority, the opening of US Interests Section is a *creative* way to engage w/ Taliban authority. /2
The US position on formal recognition is highly likely to stand until after the midterm elections. But in the interim, its Interests Section would serve as a semi/conditional recognition to protect US interests and to create a space for urgent humanitarian support/protection. /3
How Pakistan enabled the Taliban's takeover—an insider account. (THREAD)
Afghanistan’s collapse was no accident. It was a culmination of many failures—internal and external—but the nefarious role Pakistan played in the Taliban takeover was significant. 1/ wsj.com/articles/how-p…
Pakistan’s long-running dual-track approach in Afghanistan is no secret, but it became significant after the 2019 Doha negotiations. In Doha, Pakistan played Taliban whisperer and vowed to facilitate a political deal between Taliban/non-Taliban Afghans. Yet its role was vague. /2
But, in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence shrewdly expanded the scale/scope of its covert campaign in Taliban's interest. There was indeed no love lost between Afghanistan and Pakistan; in fact, the profound mutual mistrust regularly cast a dark shadow over the relationship. /3