Thread by @Thrawn589

Army Strategist time—here is my submission to @ArmyMadSci. Below is my essay thread.

"The Army’s Next Failed War: Large Scale Combat Operations"

Where are the Army is wrong about the vision of future competition & conflict.

#MadSciDivergence #miltwitter

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Strategic Lens:

The U.S. Army has adopted large-scale combat operations (LSCO) as the method of warfare to combat our adversaries, specifically China and Russia, both of whom have robust offensive and defensive capabilities across all spectrums of warfare.

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The Army’s focus on LSCO is driving the Army Capability Integration Development System (ACIDS) to produce technology & capabilities that are inefficient & ineffective against these peer adversaries by ignoring issues created by massing friendly forces on the battlefield.

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The Army is pivoting to the Division as the unit of action at the same time it is attempting to defeat an adversary that has nuclear and hypersonic weapons capable of destroying massed forces within a kill zone of over 1,750 miles (the range of some hypersonic weapons).

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It is unlikely a Division can survive long enough to make it to the enemy forward line of troops, and if it did, it likely means the U.S. has obtained an extreme advantage by surpassing the enemy’s air, sea, and long range fires capabilities.

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However, LSCO still remains a viable means of warfare against adversaries that cannot deter massing of forces and U.S. and projection of power from CONUS to the battlefield.

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Political Lens:

War with China or Russia will not come as a surprise. The U.S. requires a lengthy public and political process of authorizing the use of force and mobilization of forces required to execute LSCO against China or Russia.

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China & Russia are going to be aware & ready for U.S. military actions against them & with their cyber capabilities. They can immediately begin using cyber-attacks to degrade the U.S. military’s ability to mobilize/deploy forces from the U.S. to overseas APODs/SPODs.

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Logistical Lens:

The logistical burden to mobilize, deploy, and mass forces required for LSCO is enormous, and the logistical networks upon which our operational forces rely are vulnerable to both cyber and conventional attacks by our adversaries.

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Executing LSCO doctrine against China & Russia fails to answer how to safely enter into theater with U.S. forces without being destroyed at an APOD or SPOD.

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Due to the U.S. political process, massing forces at an overseas APOE/APOD/SPOE/SPOD, & Army Prepositioned Stock provides targets for attack.

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A Solution:
The U.S. Army funds the development & execution of a LSCO wargame depicting a conflict between the U.S. and peer adversaries covering the phases of mobilization, deployment, & massing of forces at the forward line of troops to initial contact with the enemy.

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Additionally, the wargame should have two sides, a U.S. side played by U.S. officers and a red team representing adversaries played by non-American Chinese or Russian military experts or military officers from nations with a cultural understanding of our enemies—

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—such as military officers/experts from the Republic of Korea, Japan, or NATO allies. It is crucial that the red team is free of American military biases and the U.S. way of war.

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Multiple iterations of this wargame will validate/invalidate LSCO as a strategy or lead to strategic innovation for future wars with near-peer adversaries.

End of Essay

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These are my personal thoughts and do not represent any official policy from the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or U.S. Army.

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