1/6
According to one Chinese government policy adviser, “The major problems are all interconnected: debt, local government finances, housing prices and consumption. Which one do you solve first? The pressure is coming from many directions.”
ft.com/content/13476b…
2/6
He's right. Most of China's major economic problems are inter-related, and solving one of them requires that they all be solved simultaneously, which is why it is politically so difficult. Beijing cannot isolate each imbalance and solve it one at a time.
3/6
The key problem – and its key strength until about 15 years ago – is the imbalance in the distribution of income. As long as China was severely underinvested, this imbalance forced up domestic savings and resulted in rapid growth in productive investment and surging GDP.
4/6
But once it closed the gap between actual investment and the optimal level of investment for its level of social and political development, some time in the mid-2000s, the imbalance continued to force up savings to beyond what China could productively absorb.
5/6
Everything followed from that: repressed consumption, persistent trade surpluses, soaring debt, massive amounts of unproductive investment, overvalued real estate, and mismatched balance sheets.
6/6
None of this is new, and should have been obvious over a decade ago. Unfortunately, as this 2010 essay points out, the longer it took to address the income imbalance, the more costly it would become.
carnegieendowment.org/chinafinancial…

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @michaelxpettis

8 Jan
1/6
Interesting article. it seems that the State Council has announced a pilot program designed to give markets a “decisive role” in the allocation of land, labor, capital, entrepreneurship, and technology.
caixinglobal.com/2022-01-07/chi…
2/6
This includes, according to Caixin, liberalizing restrictions on land use and supply, restrictions on labor mobility created by the hukou system, and restrictions on capital markets. Basically Beijing wants all factors of production to be allocated by market needs.
3/6
While this makes a lot of sense in principle, I'd argue that until there is a major redistribution of income, along with the associated transformation of political institutions, these reforms really cannot be implemented without a very sharp fall in the economy's growth rate.
Read 6 tweets
6 Jan
1/5
It seems, unsurprisingly, that the implementation of a much-anticipated property tax in China is likely to be postponed. As Bloomberg explains, "China has been talking about rolling out a nationwide property tax for over a decade."
bloomberg.com/news/articles/… via @markets
2/5
But "nothing has happened so far, likely due to opposition from homeowners and developers who are afraid the levy would push prices lower." if they couldn't do it when the property market was soaring, how would they be able to do it now?
3/5
Beijing has been trying to change the relationship between the central government and local governments for nearly a decade, and the property tax was an important part of that process, but this was never going to be easy.
Read 5 tweets
5 Jan
1/4
The RCEP consists of six countries with large current account surpluses that are structural in nature (China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia), two countries that are currently running large surpluses but that...
scmp.com/economy/global… via @scmpnews
2/4
normally run deficits (Australia and Indonesia), one country with a small structural surplus (Vietnam), two countries with flexible current accounts (Philippines and New Zealand), and four countries too small to matter (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar).
3/4
A rough calculation suggests that balances of the seven countries that run structural surpluses are equal to 6-8 times the absolute value of the balances of the remaining 8 countries. The collective GDP of the former is 7 times the collective GDP of the latter.
Read 4 tweets
5 Jan
1/14
Very important paper by @AdamYLiu1, Jean Oi and Yi Zhang. The authors explain the the switch in the locus of borrowing to local governments and their proxies (the LGFVs) as part of a “Grand Bargain” imposed by Zhu Rongji.
2/14
They show that in the 1990s, “While increasing the center’s share of the tax revenues, Beijing needed to find ways to keep the provincial and local governments viable and motivated by allowing them to enjoy fiscal fruits of their own efforts.”
3/14
The solution? “The central government was ready to ‘tie its hands’ and grant full fiscal autonomy to the localities as long as they gave the center the newly increased amount of tax revenues stipulated in the 1994 reform.”
Read 14 tweets
5 Jan
1/6
The banking system is struggling to meet loan quotas while keeping bad debt under control. "Chinese bank rushed to meet their annual state-imposed lending quotas last month by buying up low-risk financial instruments rather than issue loans."
ft.com/content/70451e…
2/6
The article goes on to cite one banker as saying: “The authorities want us to support the real economy while keeping bad debts under control. That is difficult to achieve in the current business environment.”
3/6
In fact this has been the heart of the problem in the Chinese economy for the past 10-15 years. The banking sector is responsible for boosting economic activity to meet high GDP growth targets but, in so doing, has had to run up enormous debts that cannot be repaid.
Read 6 tweets
4 Jan
1/9
In the same survey the PBoC found that 17.9% of urban residents in its sample intend to buy a house in the first quarter of 2022. This is the lowest share since September 2016.
2/9
At the end of the previous four years the shares of the sampled population intending to buy a home in the next three months were 23.0% (2017), 21.9% (2018), 20.7% (2019) and 19.9% (2020).
equalocean.com/briefing/20211…
3/9
I'm wary of reading too much into the data, but it seems that as of now there are 10% fewer people looking to buy homes than at this time last year, and on average 18% fewer than at the end of the three previous years. Most of that decline occurred in the past three months.
Read 9 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(