"Asked about Ryabkov keeping the door open to basing troops and equipment in Latin America, Sullivan responded: “I’m not going to respond to bluster in the public commentary.”... “If Russia were to move in that direction, we would deal with it decisively.” apnews.com/article/europe…
So, he says he won't respond to bluster and then... does it anyway. This comment is of course all over the Russian media, presented for maximum effect as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and so on and so forth.
By the way, in exploring the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was mainly the result of his concern that Moscow was not allowed to do what the US allowed itself to do in Europe.
There was a sense of resentment of 'quod licet Iovi non licet bovi" - I'd say this is the key under-appreciated motive in Moscow's policy making then and now. Why? Because it goes to the heart of Russia's self-pitying discourse on humiliation and unfair treatment by the West.
My advice would be. "Deal with it decisively" if this is in your national interest but, really, "don't respond to bluster." What's the point? Only gives fodder to propagandists.
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A mistaken view imho. Rhetoric in CEE, including in the Baltics, was very much that Russia's weakness represented a unique opportunity to escape Moscow's grip. The (not unreasonable) fear in the early-mid 1990s was that Russia would eventually succumb to its imperial fantasies.
After Zhirinovskii showed stunning results in the 1993 Duma elections, Lech Walesa memorably told Clinton that "every second Russian thought like Zhirinovskii." There followed a prolonged, brutal war in Chechnya that cast further shadow on Moscow's post-imperial credentials.
Walesa basically represented the mood across the region. And when I read this today - as someone who despised Zhirinovskii back then - I know that Walesa exaggerated. But the burden was on *us* to prove him wrong. And did we? What imperial fantasies do we still nurture?
An interesting historical document. Soviet Ambassador in Iran proposes to build up Soviet forces at the Iranian-Soviet border "to raise alarm among Iranian reactionaries." Molotov suggests to Stalin that they could just carry out military exercises in the border area.
The history of the question is as follows: in 1945 the Soviets (who at the time occupied northern Iran) helped foment an ethnic Azeri insurgency. The insurgents were de facto in control of northern Iran by late 1945. But they depended on Soviet protection.
Facing pressure from the US, Stalin was forced to withdraw troops from Iran but he did so after he achieved an agreement with Tehran that 1) they'd respect ethnic rights of the Azeris and 2) they would grant the Soviets an oil concession. Prime Minister Qavam promised to deliver.
This op-ed by @EvelynNFarkas is making rounds: defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/…. In a nutshell, she argues that the US must go to the United Nations to build a "coalition of the willing" and then demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine and Georgia or face war.
This op-ed has justly been criticised as out of touch with reality. E.g. in passages like this.
The op-ed has a lot of history. Problem is, the "beginning of the end of the international order" refers to international order created in 1945, which entailed "acceptance of Russian gains," including significant territorial changes. Awful? Yes.But let's not kid ourselves.
A rather uninspiring op-ed by Bret Stephens: nytimes.com/2022/01/11/opi…. Makes some far-fetched claims about Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which inter alia show that he has no idea what he is talking about, which is a familiar feature to those of us who follow Bret Stephens).
But this here is a real jewel of historical comparisons. Ok. The US airlift in 1973 *postdated* Egypt's and Syria's attack. In fact, even after the Yom Kippur war started, Nixon/HAK were reluctant to authorise an airlift to Israel. They only did it after the Soviet began theirs.
By launching an airlift to Ukraine, the US will (most certainly) provoke a war that it is ostensibly trying to avoid. OK what happens then. Oh, I see.
Watched Lavrov's interview on Dec. 22, where he recycled the claim that @mfa_russia uses to justify Russia's demands for guarantees of NATO's non-enlargement. Lavrov: "No participant of the OSCE should ensure their security by damaging the security of others." Let's do a thread.
This claim was also mentioned in the recent MFA document that presented Russia's demands. Here are the relevant excerpts. The undertaking not to strengthen one's security at another's expense is traced back to the 1990 Charter of Paris & the OSCE's 1999 Istanbul document.
Let's check the 1990 Charter of Paris first. osce.org/files/f/docume…. Here's the relevant paragraph. What do we see here? We see that Lavrov is right (re "indivisible" security) but we see that he ignored another sentence in the same paragraph about freedom to choose alliances.
What should we do with Russia's security proposals? The obvious temptation is to dismiss them as propaganda and reject them outright. I'd argue this is not the best approach. Instead, the package should be "untied" (to use a term that made the 1987 INF breakththrough possible).
Consider e.g. Article 5 - the undertaking not to deploy INF and shorter-range weapons. This is a constructive proposal that would help strategic stability. Reject? No, pursue and see what happens.
What about Article 3. Russia's proposal to improve coordination to prevent accidental escalation, especially in the Black Sea and the Baltics + an undertaking not to see the other side as the enemy. Reject? No, pursue and see what happens.