An interesting development in Ukraine today that will go under the radar for most country watchers but which is badly-timed from the point of few of diffusing Russian-Ukrainian tensions: provisions of Art. 25 of the Ukrainian Language Law go into effect.
These require that the minority language print media furnish Ukrainian versions of their publications. Here's the relevant provision. This does not apply to publications in English and "EU languages" and mainly affects Russian publications.
I re-read the Venice Commission verdict on this law, which is (predictably) highly critical of provisions that discriminate against Russian, including Art. 25.
True to my consistent opposition to toxic nationalism, I'd have to agree with the Venice Commission and conclude that I find many provisions of this law quite appalling, and do not see how they can constitute a viable basis for fostering Ukraine's European identity.
Also, they serve useful propaganda for the Kremlin. ria.ru/20220116/yazyk…
Now, one might argue that drawing attention to provisions of this dubious law is a way of deflecting from Russia's aggressive build-up on Ukrainian borders, and that *that* is the real issue, and not the question of how the Russian minority is treated in Ukraine.
And I will agree that it is certainly the elephant in the room. But it is important to remember that Russian-Ukrainian relations are an equation with many variables, and keeping an eye on other variables is an important exercise on its own terms.
In general, I am just opposed to toxic nationalism in all of its forms, including its Russian and Ukrainian varieties.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Sergey Radchenko

Sergey Radchenko Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @DrRadchenko

Jan 14,
A mistaken view imho. Rhetoric in CEE, including in the Baltics, was very much that Russia's weakness represented a unique opportunity to escape Moscow's grip. The (not unreasonable) fear in the early-mid 1990s was that Russia would eventually succumb to its imperial fantasies.
After Zhirinovskii showed stunning results in the 1993 Duma elections, Lech Walesa memorably told Clinton that "every second Russian thought like Zhirinovskii." There followed a prolonged, brutal war in Chechnya that cast further shadow on Moscow's post-imperial credentials.
Walesa basically represented the mood across the region. And when I read this today - as someone who despised Zhirinovskii back then - I know that Walesa exaggerated. But the burden was on *us* to prove him wrong. And did we? What imperial fantasies do we still nurture?
Read 4 tweets
Jan 14,
"Asked about Ryabkov keeping the door open to basing troops and equipment in Latin America, Sullivan responded: “I’m not going to respond to bluster in the public commentary.”... “If Russia were to move in that direction, we would deal with it decisively.” apnews.com/article/europe…
So, he says he won't respond to bluster and then... does it anyway. This comment is of course all over the Russian media, presented for maximum effect as evidence of U.S. hypocrisy and so on and so forth.
By the way, in exploring the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I came to the conclusion that Khrushchev's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba was mainly the result of his concern that Moscow was not allowed to do what the US allowed itself to do in Europe.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 13,
An interesting historical document. Soviet Ambassador in Iran proposes to build up Soviet forces at the Iranian-Soviet border "to raise alarm among Iranian reactionaries." Molotov suggests to Stalin that they could just carry out military exercises in the border area.
The history of the question is as follows: in 1945 the Soviets (who at the time occupied northern Iran) helped foment an ethnic Azeri insurgency. The insurgents were de facto in control of northern Iran by late 1945. But they depended on Soviet protection.
Facing pressure from the US, Stalin was forced to withdraw troops from Iran but he did so after he achieved an agreement with Tehran that 1) they'd respect ethnic rights of the Azeris and 2) they would grant the Soviets an oil concession. Prime Minister Qavam promised to deliver.
Read 5 tweets
Jan 13,
This op-ed by @EvelynNFarkas is making rounds: defenseone.com/ideas/2022/01/…. In a nutshell, she argues that the US must go to the United Nations to build a "coalition of the willing" and then demand that Russia withdraw from Ukraine and Georgia or face war.
This op-ed has justly been criticised as out of touch with reality. E.g. in passages like this.
The op-ed has a lot of history. Problem is, the "beginning of the end of the international order" refers to international order created in 1945, which entailed "acceptance of Russian gains," including significant territorial changes. Awful? Yes.But let's not kid ourselves.
Read 12 tweets
Jan 12,
A rather uninspiring op-ed by Bret Stephens: nytimes.com/2022/01/11/opi…. Makes some far-fetched claims about Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which inter alia show that he has no idea what he is talking about, which is a familiar feature to those of us who follow Bret Stephens).
But this here is a real jewel of historical comparisons. Ok. The US airlift in 1973 *postdated* Egypt's and Syria's attack. In fact, even after the Yom Kippur war started, Nixon/HAK were reluctant to authorise an airlift to Israel. They only did it after the Soviet began theirs.
By launching an airlift to Ukraine, the US will (most certainly) provoke a war that it is ostensibly trying to avoid. OK what happens then. Oh, I see.
Read 4 tweets
Dec 28, 2021
Watched Lavrov's interview on Dec. 22, where he recycled the claim that @mfa_russia uses to justify Russia's demands for guarantees of NATO's non-enlargement. Lavrov: "No participant of the OSCE should ensure their security by damaging the security of others." Let's do a thread.
This claim was also mentioned in the recent MFA document that presented Russia's demands. Here are the relevant excerpts. The undertaking not to strengthen one's security at another's expense is traced back to the 1990 Charter of Paris & the OSCE's 1999 Istanbul document. Image
Let's check the 1990 Charter of Paris first. osce.org/files/f/docume…. Here's the relevant paragraph. What do we see here? We see that Lavrov is right (re "indivisible" security) but we see that he ignored another sentence in the same paragraph about freedom to choose alliances. Image
Read 8 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(