What's so dumb about this is that the EXACT SAME AUTHORS of the paper reviewed here ALSO did a paper studying ONLY ADOPTIONS, and find that the negative effects on women are EXACTLY THE SAME.
Here's the paper. They ask "Does biology drive the motherhood penalty?" and they find the answer is "No, not at all." aeaweb.org/articles?id=10…
Adopted children hurt mothers' incomes just as much as gestational children.
What impacts mothers' career trajectory is child*rearing* more than child*bearing*, tho having a baby and putting up for adoption probably impacts as well.
So, will artificial wombs lead to women's equality?
No. Absolutely not. In fact, if artificial wombs make child*bearing* much easier without making child*rearing* easier, they could actually *worsen* women's equality!
Assuming AWs don't alter the underlying determinants of women having more childrearing work, one can easily imagine cheaper reproduction leading to escalating care duties for women.
More broadly, artificial wombs will only increase fertility for very wealthy people or for collective institutions with strong pro-natal interests and inclinations. For normal people, childrearing is the big cost, not childbearing.
So aside from my repugnance at the idea generally, the idea that removing from women a social role which afford them prestige and leverage within a family will increase women's status is just bonkers to me.
What it does is it makes wives more expendable.
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There's absolutely no way you get these numbers without having widespread *marital fertility control*.
Folks the Zhou, Zha, and Gu lines here are marital TFRs around 3 or 4. That's not that much higher than many modern post-contraceptive marital fertility rates!
Especially once you account for different child mortality. Probably if MCFR was 3.5, the share surviving to puberty would be just 2.5 or so, whereas today an MTFR of 2.5 yields surviving fertility of like 2.4 or 2.45, and we commonly see MTFR of 2-2.5 in western societies.
One of the big issues here is that we won't know if artificial wombs create developmental problems until like 40 years after they have begun to be used on a large scale.
Suppose there are 1,000 conditions we "care about" and the average condition impacts 1% of births in the real world and 5% in artificial wombs, and that there's no way to ID the condition while in the womb.
Suppose conditions manifest on average at age 20, normally distributed.
Basically, they show that almost the *entire* relationship between "Christian Nationalism" and "support for extremist violence" is mediated through "belief in religious prophecy."
They use four questions to assess belief in prophecy, described here, and I only have any appreciable objection as an indicator to one of them, "God is in control," which also happens to be the most common belief, so probably the least strongly predictive. religioninpublic.blog/2022/01/20/the…
This is the key chart. On an index of expressed support for violent political activity, Christian Nationalism ONLY predicts support for violence IF you have high belief in prophecy. For low-prophecy-believers, More "Christian Nationalism" = LESS support for violence!
Apropos @elonmusk 's demography comments and an exchange with @ikashnitsky , it's interesting to ask, "Just how reliable are major global demographic databases?"
My view: not very!
This is not because the demographers at UNPD or IHME are doofuses or something; it's because producing big global forecasts is extremely difficult even when the data is all homogenous and reliable. But sorting through competing data sources that disagree is even harder!
Infamously, very smart demographers disagree about China's population to the tune of tens or hundreds of millions of people, and China's TFR is debated to be anywhere from 0.9 to 1.7 in recent years! Right there, that tells you global forecasts are gonna be dicey.