I would argue Russia has deployed the necessary equipment but just needs to send troops to man that equipment at this point. They will also move in another 10+ VDV BTGs if they decide to escalate. The slow preparation steps have already been taken, the next steps would be quicker
Let's not forget how many troops Russia's Military Transport Aviation can move on short notice. They moved quite a bit of equipment to Kazakhstan over the span of a week. Flying troops is much easier.
Russia has ~70 BTGs near Ukraine with important additional army and district-level assets (e.g. S-300V, Redut-2US, Iskander-M). If they continue moving units at this rate and deploy the VDV, they'll have half of the Russian military's BTGs near Ukraine in ~2 weeks.
That's why it is useful to focus on the heavy equipment that takes time to deploy like S-300V. We won't necessarily have much warning if Russia deploys troops to man the equipment, deploys the rest of the VDV, or stands up field hospitals.
A nice rundown of perspectives. I want to emphasize that Russia's current behavior—the demands, rhetoric, and buildup—are unprecedented. It is entirely possible that Russia's next steps will not be similar to previous uses of military force but could also be unprecedented.
So we are all debating how much a Russian escalation would look like 2008, 2014, and 2015. All of those events had an external catalyst that led to Russia's response. If Russia escalates now without such a clear event, it would be a significant departure from previous behavior.2/
There is a lot of uncertainty about which COA Russia may choose, and they could of course change their ultimate goal after deciding to escalate depending on how the conflict is going. We should also keep in mind that the Russian military is much more capable than 2008-2015. 3/
A potentially pretty significant development. These are S-300V-series air defense/ballistic missile defense systems reportedly in Bryansk near the border with Ukraine. These would be used to defend against Ukrainian Tochka-U tactical ballistic missiles. t.me/milinfolive/75…
I haven't seen the video yet, but that is a credible Telegram channel. Russia likely wouldn't conduct an escalation without more of them near the border. There are still some pieces we'd expect to see moved before a ground invasion, but this was one I was looking for.
I think Mike and I agree on most aspects of the situation other than the military option. I still think a more aggressive version of the 2008 conflict possibly ending with Russian forces outside Kyiv is the most likely option. But what if Kyiv doesn’t concede at that point?
I don’t know. A further escalation possibly requiring an occupation could be necessary, but I don’t think that is Russia’s ideal end state. Russian goals could also change once a conflict begins. They could become more or less ambitious depending on how events turn out. 2/
The demands, military buildup, and other aspects of Russia’s behavior are unprecedented, which means it is difficult to apply previous Russian uses of force to inform our view of what they will do now. Maybe it looks like 2008 or maybe Moscow decides that it need to go farther.3/
Wishful thinking. Putin has overseen:
-2nd Chechen War
-2008 Russo-Georgian War
-Invasion of Ukraine 2014-
-Intervention in Syria 2015-
Russia sustained thousands of KIAs in those conflicts. If Putin decides to escalate, he'll be prepared to sustain hundreds of casualties or more
Putin's record isn't perfect, but he has more experience using military force than any other leader in the world. Is there much evidence that Russian casualties sustained in these conflicts significantly hurt his domestic approval? We shouldn't underestimate him.
Again, if your only conception of how Russia will use force is a large-scale occupation, you're likely exaggerating how many casualties Russia will face.
A channel run by Belarusian rail workers says that 33 military echelons have arrived in Belarus from Russia with an average of 50 cars per train over the past 7 days compared to 29 over an entire month for the Zapad 2021 exercise. They claim 200 echelons are scheduled to arrive.
They claim that 200 echelons is an unprecedented figure. The Tik Tok videos indicate the 33 echelon figure could be accurate. If there are another ~170 trains scheduled to arrive, that could transport a substantial force. 2/ t.me/belzhd_live/12…
If the 200 echelon figure is accurate, that indicates that Russia is planning on sending nearly 10 times the amount of military equipment deployed during the Zapad 2021 exercise. It would also indicate that we're only seeing the beginning of deployments to Belarus. 3/
The US did not intervene during Russia's wars with Georgia in 2008 nor Ukraine in 2014. Why would Afghanistan change their view of the situation since the other two cases are far more relevant?
Russia's escalation with Ukraine is driven by a number of things, mostly related to internal Ukrainian politics, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and NATO-Ukrainian cooperation. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is almost completely irrelevant.
If anything, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan forced Russia to reinforce units in Central Asia, which can't easily be used against Ukraine, creating a new security problem for Moscow. Russian foreign policy decisions generally cannot be explained with a US-centric approach.