Racial resentment, from this alternative scale, stems from just-world orientation & legitimizing racial myths, not prejudice, producing retribution in support of maintaining the status quo
The traditional racial resentment scale has become more closely tied to views of liberals & conservatives over time & is not closely tied to views of whites
Support for voting rights is higher when they are characterized as general laws that would protect a group rather than special laws targeted at protecting that group
Racial resentment helped explain blame on Obama, the success of Trump’s Make America Great Again slogan, & racial & non-racial policy attitudes, but is partly tied to social dominance orientation & system justification that are also explanations
Black Americans have a distinct form of racial resentment against whites’ denial of racial discrimination & Black effort that better explains their views than linked fate
Across Western democracies, the education divide slowly reversed where the educated now vote for parties of the left, even as the income divide (with rich voting for parties of the right) usually remained
There is no cross-national increase in the age divide. But later generations have both been more educated & more likely to divide in their voting based on education (with educated younger voting left & non-educated younger voting right) hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?is…
There has also been a reversal of the gender divide in most Western countries; women used to be more likely to vote for parties of the right & are now more likely to vote for parties of the left, but there is plenty of variation
Democratic partisanship increases with Republican extremism but decreases as Democrats move leftward, especially among Southern Whites. Simulations for 2020 suggest these strong negative effects of an aggressive leftward move
Their measure of left-right movement is perceptions of the party partitions on all ANES scales, which include racial & non-racial issue positions as well as ideology. At individual & aggregate levels, moving away from the perceived center loses adherents press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book…
They extend the model (with tweaks for multi-partyism) to Australia, Canada, & the UK. There are also short-term shifts due to circumstances or performance & voter position changes, but changes in perceived party ideological positions drive a lot of longer-term change.
Most poli sci may agree with this. But when it comes to explaining federal policy change, policy historians tend to find plenty of important idiosyncratic individual-level factors. And structural factors don't explain as much policy change as we expect: mattgrossmann.tumblr.com/artistsofthepo…
But individual agency does not imply lack of structure. e.g. Manchin is the pivotal vote due to structural factors.
Most proposed policy changes fail. Structure often explains what is possible, but laws still require lots of individual actions & compromises to be enacted.
The relationships among key policymakers are the most common proximate factors in successful policy change. Their opportunities are made possible by structural factors, but the actors still have to succeed.
Commenting on national politics is not efficacious compared to acting in local politics, even if you are most concerned with national outcomes & electoral rules nytimes.com/2022/01/09/opi…
But I don’t think Democratic uninvolvement in local politics is a huge issue; where they are most involved, it is often in NIMBYism & professional interests. There are people running in most winnable places & no great Republican advantage. Fundraising & volunteering are high
& the biggest missing local officers & candidates are non-Trumpist Republicans. Neither problem can be solved by city liberals. But nothing wrong with improving your own local governance
Getting House & all but 1 same-party Senator on board with ~full plausible presidential agenda in 1st year is historically unusual progress. They won over the other key holdout. How did they do it? By rewriting half the bill to meet their (~ridiculous) terms. They can do it again
Pelosi had unmeetable conflicting ~plausible demands & ~managed face saving. But Schumer? He spent a month arguing with the parliamentarian & claiming a quick vote. He didn’t prepare caucus & make the cuts. They miscalculated. They need Manchin & called the wrong bluff
This statement isn’t going to help. But news here is that Manchin made a full final offer this week for 1.75T (presumably of ~permanent programs). White House didn’t accept (it was “missing key priorities”). This suggests he was more specific in private. They can take the deal
Don’t view this as final. They have to substantially cut the bill to meet Manchin’s terms (1.75 in ~permanent programs). Everyone else’s “red lines” are not real because they prefer a reduced bill to nothing; Manchin has the leverage, some others are slow to realize
Manchin has been ~consistent since the July letter, actually come up 250B but clear he didn’t except sunsets to get to his ceiling. Many didn’t want to hear it or fell for others’ bluffs. “make him vote against it” doesn’t work with someone running to cameras to say he’s a no
Still paths to passage: 1) Biden can meet Manchin’s demands & say this is it 2) split the bill, match sections Manchin accepts with payfors
But also paths to nowhere: 1) “we’re ready to vote” 2) we’re still fighting for immigration, House bill 3) make him identify/sell the cuts