It's probably a 4,500 km-range Hwasong-12 IRBM based on the trajectory. Compare:
Hwasong-12 test on May 14 2012:
787 km range
2,111.5 km apogee
~30 minute flight time.
UI missile test on January 29, 2022
800 km range
>2000 km apogee
~30 minute flight time
North Korea has tested a lot missiles recently, but this is a big step. In 2018, Kim announced a moratorium on intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missile launches. North Korea has now broken that moratorium. ICBM tests are almost certain to follow.
I should say: The ROK/GOJ numbers could turn out to be wrong. Or it could be a new missile, like a solid, with a similar range as the Hwasong-12. We won't know until we see pictures tomorrow. So, caveat lector. But for now, it looks like a Hwasong-12.
*2017 not 2012z
*May 2017 not 2012.
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North Korea is going to be launching a lot of interesting stuff again. Here's the information we get, where we get it from and when.
Within minutes, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff usually texts an announcement to reporters first. This appears in @YonhapNews, ROK's state media, which will update the story repeatedly through the day, adding details each time. Yonhap has issued four versions of the story already.
The details usually include the time of launch, place, distance and apogee. The ROK used to give flight-time; lately they've been giving burnout velocity in the form of a Mach number. These estimates are rounded and often don't match what the North Koreans will later say.
A short thread on North Korea's "hypersonic" missile test. It's a MaRV.
All long-range missiles are hypersonic! The range of a ballistic missile is, to a first approximation, a function of the velocity of a missile at burnout. Any ballistic missile that travels more than a few hundred kilometers will be traveling faster than Mach 5 (1.75 km/s).
What North Korea tested was a hypersonic glider. The system flew 700 km. The warhead separated at some point and glided for a few hundred kilometers, including a 120 km cross-range glide. I mocked up some trajectories; they're only sort of to scale.
I was quoted in this @defense_news story about Morocco's expanding air defense capabilities. Don't feel like writing a blog post, so here's a thread on what little I was able to add with OSINT. defensenews.com/global/mideast…
In December, a Spanish-language publication reported that Morocco had taken delivery of some very capable Chinese surface-to-air missiles (HQ-9B/FD-2000B). defensa.com/africa-asia-pa…
Defensa.com said the missiles were deployed at Morocco's "first military base dedicated to long-range air defense ... near the city of Sidi Yahya el-Gharb" and published a May 2021 satellite image from @googleearth of the site.
This amazing reporting by @ZcohenCNN is exactly the kind of collaboration that @JamesMartinCNS wants to continue with @CNN and @planet. I think it is civil society at its best. A short thread.
In 2013, @JanesINTEL identified a missile base at this location; a few years later @fab_hinz noticed that the sit had changed significantly. We ultimately assessed the place was a Chinese constructed missile facility: washingtonpost.com/world/national…
Our story prompted people in Congress to start asking questions. Eventually someone spilled the beans. The Trump Administration was actively withholding this information from Congress, @ZcohenCNN reported. cnn.com/2019/06/05/pol…
First, there is no upside to threatening force at this late date. The Iran nuclear deal appears very much to be dead and I strongly suspect that the Iranians are en route to nuclear latency/opacity. Threatening the use of force is unlikely to alter that outcome in my opinion.
One problem with nonproliferation wonks is that we warn US officials about the dangers of a certain course of action, but after they do it anyway, we advise about how to mitigate those dangers. We call it being "policy relevant." People who treat drunks call it "enabling."
No one should be surprised by orbital bombardment, although the glider is a nice touch. The Soviets deployed an orbital bombardment system in the 1970s. This is an old concept that is newly relevant as a way to defeat missile defenses.
I wrote a short thread last month on why I think orbital bombardment makes sense for Russia, China and North Korea -- especially if gliders mean they can improve accuracy.
But really, I've been banging on about orbital bombardment for several years now. It's obvious: The US put a missile defense system in Alaska to defend against missiles coming over the North Pole. What did you think Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang will do? Just give up?